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BOOK REVIEW – “THE MUNSTER REPUBLIC:THE CIVIL WAR IN NORTH CORK” BY MICHAEL HARRINGTON

BOOK REVIEW – “THE MUNSTER REPUBLIC:THE

CIVIL WAR IN NORTH CORK” BY MICHAEL

HARRINGTON

“They had spent two years on the run fighting the might of the British army… The vast majority of the Volunteers were young men plucked from working on the land or from employment as clerks in offices or shops. Some of the officers had second-level education, few had third-level qualifications, and the education of most of the Volunteers would have ended at primary-school level. Their understanding of national freedom was narrow; in essence it meant the ejection from the country of British troops and the British system of government, and its replacement with a form of government that they believed was free and fundamentally Irish. Consequently, the vast majority of the Volunteers did not have the opportunity to consider the concept of republicanism in any depth, let alone the implications of democracy.

“Republicanism for the Volunteers was shorthand for anti-British nationalism, combined with traditional insurrectionism. Republicanism was an expression of Irish identity, and the cry of “Up the Republic” was hurled provocatively at the hated occupying forces. It did not have any philosophical basis. Nor did it imply any future structure of government beyond a native Irish government based on self-determination.”

These were the preconditions of the ‘Civil War’ according to a book called The Munster Republic: The Civil War In North Cork by Michael Harrington published in 2009 by the Mercier Press. The book “started out as a thesis”. It is the “third level qualification” view of the War of Independence: it was fought by ignoramuses who did not know what they were fighting for, did not know what republicanism was, or what democracy was, and who therefore did not know when to stop fighting.

But who “plucked” them from their labour in the farms and the offices, gave them a few war-cries to utter, and put them fighting without a “philosophical basis “? Surely it was in England that was done, with virtual conscription followed by actual conscription! Or in Redmondite Ireland, which siphoned people into the British Army with crude shibboleths. But never mind the facts. Learn to feel the feelings of our new quality education which aspires to comprehensive thought control.

What did the plucking is not material. The story is that the ignorant lower classes were plucked from useful labour in farms and shops—what, no tradesmen! were they Poles even then?— and put fighting in the IRA without knowing what they were fighting about.

“In post-First World War Ireland, democracy was sometimes interpreted in different ways. Universal suffrage among males was in its infancy, women did not have the right to vote [!!!], and the implications of full civil rights for all had not been addressed. Some people believed that a democratic government based on the will of all the people… was appropriate. But many others believed that government decisions should be based on general collective will demonstrated over several generations of Irish people, and that doctrines embedded in this general will should influence decision-making in government, even if the expressed will of the majority of the people at a certain point was otherwise. Hence the view that the majority did not have the right to do wrong… In this way republicans could justify taking up arms against the majority of the country because the will of earlier generations had been a complete break from, not the reaching of an accommodation with, Britain…” (p137).

Now this is puzzling. The ignorant Volunteers plucked from the farms and shops had an understanding of things drawn from the most philosophical of all modern political theorists, Edmund Burke, who held that the present generation had no right to do as they pleased, but were bound to preserve the inheritance of past generations and transmit it to future generations. And C.C. O’Brien told us we should revere Burke, did he not?

Harrington’s quite short Bibliography includes two books by Peter Hart (who of course interviews the dead) and three by Tom Garvin. He seems to have been much influenced by the view of things expounded in Garvin’s 1922: The Birth Of Irish Democracy.

Garvin in 1922 puts one in mind of Nietzsche on the immoral history of morality and the taming by violence of human impulse in the cause of civilisation. The ‘Civil War’ brought us to our senses—or it tortured our senses into the bourgeois/capitalist mould. The ‘Civil War’ was about forcing a wild society—a society made wild by its newly established independence gained in a surge of unrealistic expectations—into the narrow constraints of bourgeois life under capitalism.

Garvin does not accept that a genuine will to independence was expressed in 1918. He says that the Election, though policed by the British apparatus of state, was rigged by a small minority of Republican intimidators. (He says that in some places and says something else in other places, but that is the sense of his account of the ‘Civil war’.)

By means of skilfully directed terrorism the small, active minority, obliged the populace to behave as if they had willed independence and fought for it against the Imperialistic intransigence of the British Democracy. Because the people had not willed what they fought for they did not know when they had gained it. Britain conceded independence with the Treaty, but it did not live up to the unrealistic expectations of those who had been excited by the fighting. Therefore they did not want what they had won, and it had to be imposed on them by superior force by an active authoritarian element which knew what freedom meant if it was to be functional. Viable democracy emerged from the purposeful infliction of pain on the idealists by the authoritarians.

Garvin etc. make a point of seeing Ireland post-1918 in what they think is an international context. They mean that what happened in Ireland was of a kind with what was happening elsewhere.

It is not at all impossible that a people should fight for independence with anarchic assumptions about what independence would be like, and should then be hammered into shape by purposeful authoritarians. Something like that happened even in Italy, which disrupted itself through its Irredentist war on Austria (egged on by Britain and the Redmondites). It emerged from  the War in the “exalted” condition attributed to the Irish by Garvin, Foster etc., and then had to be battered back into shape by Mussolini.

That is not what happened in Ireland. Some of the Treatyites, who did not feel it was appropriate to defend the Treaty as a submission to irresistible Imperialist force with a view to fighting another day, believed or pretended that it was what happened. The difference between pretence and belief is not easy to pin down in a case like this. One easily becomes the other. (See Pascal.) And some of the Treatyites lived out that pretence/belief very earnestly in the 1930s when they became Fascists for the purpose of suppressing the anarchy within which Irish Bolshevism was lurking.

But the Irish disorder of 1922 was not the disorder of independence won with anarchist expectations. Nationalist Ireland was well adapted to the bourgeois/capitalist order of things long before 1918. The land agitation parted company with anarchic Utopianism, or Millenarianism (which revisionists love to find in nooks and crannies) about 1850 when Gavan Duffy launched the Tenant Leagues on the assumptions of bourgeois political economy—and on that ground made common cause with the Ulster Protestant farmers. And, half a century later, Canon Sheehan and William O’Brien, in active alliance with the Orangemen, got rid of the landlord system strictly within the order of bourgeois political economy. And then Sheehan and O’Brien made a serious bid to consolidate the gains of 1903 within a coherent capitalist order of things, and to sweep aside the sectarian grievance-mongering being peddled by the Redmondites. And they succeeded in County Cork and adjacent areas—which is where the War of Independence was fought in the main.

The Dail Government policed the country in 1919-21 in accordance with the bourgeoiscapitalist order of things. The capitalist order of property was held sacred by it, as well as by the society which elected it, leaving aside a residue of problematic forms of landed property in the Midlands. The country did not need to be tortured into capitalist ways in 1922. That torturing had been done generations earlier. And what had been sought by the great agitations launched by Duffy and completed by Sheehan and O’Brien was not some unrealisable Utopia, but access to the capitalist way.

There were elements of Utopian phrasemongering in Redmondism to the end. But Sinn Fein was bourgeois from the start. (Griffith’s guide in these matters was the political economist of national-capitalist development, Frederick List.) And the Sinn Fein Party as reconstructed after 1916 was the bourgeois party of a society which had settled down into bourgeois ways. Garvin prefers to ignore that development, as does Harrington.

If the British Democracy had recognised Irish independence when it was asserted in January 1919, I can see no reason to think that anything but bourgeois social order would have followed.

Such disorder as occurred in 1919-21 was the result of the British military attempt to prevent the elected Irish Government from governing. And the disorder of 1922 resulted from the success of the British Democracy in breaking up the Irish Democracy and obliging it to make war on itself.

According to Harrington: “The Civil War did not happen overnight—it was at least one full year in gestation…” (p15). This accords with the academic view of recent decades, often asserted but never demonstrated, that it was the outcome of basic differences within the Sinn Fein party of 1918-21.

“When the Civil War finally began, it seemed that the republicans had the advantage… Yet within two months Provisional Government forces controlled the towns and cities…” (p16).

I doubt if it seemed to De Valera in late June 1922 that the anti-Treatyites had the advantage. About 40 years ago I read the papers for the first six months of 1922. It seemed to me that the Treatyite leaders had prepared for war from the moment they became the Provisional Government on Whitehall authority. They strong along the Anti-Treatyites while they built up a heavily armed mercenary (paid) army with British support. When they struck, they did so with organised force against a disorganised enemy that had made no real preparation for war.

The Anti-Treatyites were strung along by means of juggling with the Dail Government, with its Sinn Fein party and Volunteer Army, and the Provisional Government and its professional Army. Griffith and Collins played a double act, with Griffith running the Dail and Collins the Provisional Government. But it was Griffith who pressed for war and Collins who delayed. Then Collins struck from a position of strength, and in a little over a month it was all over but for the mopping up of pockets of guerilla resistance in Munster.

When I was satisfied that I knew what was the case in January-June 1922 I thought no more about it for over twenty years. I was trying to deal with the Northern situation, and Northern nationalism tended to be pro-Treaty. When I was asked to give a talk at Newmarket about the Civil War, I merely said it was fought over Crown sovereignty and created the party system of the 26 Counties. It was fortunate that I had not gone into the matter any further as I was told at the end of the meeting that it was the first public discussion of the Civil War in North Cork since it ended, and people were on tenterhooks about it.

Anyhow, forty years ago I thought I knew what had gone on between the Treaty and the War but suspended judgment on it until I was finished with Belfast politics.

Harrington says: “The delegates, unsurprisingly believed themselves to be full plenipotentiaries”. They made a Treaty, as they were entitled to do. The Dail ratified the Treaty.

De Valera, who used to be a democrat, rejected the Treaty, either out of pique at not being obeyed, as some suggest, or out of rivalry with Collins for the leadership as Ryle Dwyer suggests. He became ambivalent about democracy and made speeches which can only be understood as incitement against the democracy. The democracy acted to defend itself. That seems to be more or less Harrington’s story.

I remember much talk about “plenipotentiaries” from when I was very young and was surprised to see it being recycled. A plenipotentiary is a diplomat on whom the power of state is conferred for the purpose of making arrangements with another state. He is a creature of a bygone era when travel was slow and there were no telephones.

Whatever the Dail delegates were, they were not in fact plenipotentiaries. They did not present their credentials as authorised representatives of a foreign state at the Court of St. James and have them accepted. The Dail was not recognised by Britain as having any legitimate authority. It was a bunch of rebels. Britain would be willing to make a deal with some of these rebels and set them up in subordinate authority. After much haggling it put its final offer on the table and demanded that it be signed at once by the rebels. The Prime Minister had two letters in his hands.

One of them meant peace, the other war. If the rebels signed it would be peace, and they would be set up in authority. If they did not all sign immediately it would be war. Mr. Shakespeare was waiting to see which of the letters he would rush off to Belfast with. The rebels signed and made themselves the Provisional Government of Southern Ireland.

The delegates were rebels in London but, until that moment, they had taken themselves to be representatives of the sovereign authority in Ireland. They were under instruction to sign nothing without the approval of the Dail Government. But they could not consult their Government because Mr. Shakespeare was waiting. And anyway weren’t they plenipotentiaries?

Argument about Mr. Shakespeare was part of my childhood. Later on I thought of looking him up. He turned out to be a member of an influential Baptist family at a time when Nonconformists were entering the ruling elite as a matter of course. In 1921 he became a member of Lloyd George’s Secretariat. About 30 years later he published his memoirs, and described the Treaty’ signing: /

“About seven-thirty Lloyd George delivered his famous ultimatum. The Irish delegates, he said, were plenipotentiaries and they must sign now. If they refused to sign, war would follow immediately…

‘I have sometimes wondered since whether Lloyd George was right in presenting that ultimatum. I am convinced on mature reflection that but for the ultimatum we might have had no treaty. Supposing the Irish delegates had not signed that night; that the negotiations had terminated inconclusively; that the final decision was left over to the Republican atmosphere in Dublin, which had a few days previously rejected Dominion status. Would the treaty have emerged intact? I doubt it. As it was, here were the five Irish delegates committed before the world by their signatures to the approval of the treaty and going before the Irish Cabinet and the Dail to recommend its acceptance. Even so, the treaty survived only by the narrow margin of seven votes in the Dail…

“If, then, Lloyd George was right in attaching the utmost importance to the fait accompliand to the Irish signing that night, he was entitled to use the most potent weapon in his armoury. The delegates to whom the ultimatum was delivered had been in prison, had been hunted, had seen their comrades executed or shot, their homesteads razed to the ground. Savage guerilla warfare had ravaged their homeland. The ultimatum conjured up before their eyes further years of bloodshed and reprisals on a vaster scale.

“I have, however, never understood why the Irish accepted the ultimatum at its face value. Why did they not call the bluff? Lloyd George stated over and over again that he had promised to let Sir James Craig know next day (Tuesday, December 6) one way or the other. Supposing Arthur Griffith had said: “What is sacrosanct about Tuesday? We have waited hundreds of years for a settlement… Are you really going to break the truce and plunge Ireland again into war without giving the Irish Cabinet the chance of discussing your latest proposals?” How could Lloyd George have persisted with the ultimatum if Arthur Griffith had argued like this.

“But the Irish delegation did not counter the ultimatum with logic. They bowed to it and signed.  I am nevertheless puzzled to find the reason. Was it that Arthur Griffith, having won the substance of Irish independence, signed because he, too, thought it would be more difficult for the Dail to repudiate it?

“Perhaps, as so often is the case, the simplest explanation is the true one. In the debate in the Dail on the treaty Barton said: “The English Prime Minister, with all the solemnity and the power of conviction he alone of all men I have ever met can impart by word and gesture, declared that limit of his patience. He threatened war, he looked war, and he intended war, unless they signed.

No one could doubt his sincerity when his word “imparted conviction”, his eyes flashed lighting. How dare they question the ultimatum? They were awed and they signed…

“I dined with Lloyd George that night alone. He was in a mood of suppressed excitement.

“I have delivered my ultimatum”, he said. I am not giving his exact words, but this was the effect of them: “We have offered full Dominion status. Either they sign now or negotiations are off. If there is a break we will put into Ireland a large force and restore order. I told them as much and it is now up to them to choose between peace and war.” Estimates of the size of the force needed to hold down Southern Ireland varied, but the highest figure mentioned was 250,000 men.

“One significant remark made by Lloyd George as he was leaving I shall always remember:

“If only Michael Collins”, he said, “has as much moral courage as he has physical courage, we shall get a settlement. But moral courage is a much higher quality than physical courage, and it is a quality that brave men often lack”…” (Sir Geoffrey Shakespeare. Let Candles Be Brought In, 1949, p87-9).

So the Irish delegates were hustled, bluffed, intimidated, and over-awed. They forgot what they were and became rebels against their own government. Collins denied in the Dail that he had signed under the impact of the threat of immediate war, and there is evidence that his decision was made beforehand. In that case the persuading was not all done by Lloyd George. Collins and Griffith were party to the final hustling of the other delegates. But Griffith seems to have had little talent for negotiation or for the handling of power. His mind ran on a short-circuit and he had little influence. It was Collins who counted. And it was Collins who took the crucial decision to make a  settlement without consulting the Dail Government.

What matters is not whether the British position was final, but Collins’s decision not to make the Dail Government deal with his conclusion that it was final and that it must either settle for it or prepare for war. He pre-empted the Dail Government, knowing that the immense British propaganda apparatus would be immediately activated in support of him, and that the situation when he came back to Dublin after signing would be utterly different from what it would have been if he had come back before signing to put it to the Dail Government that the final position had been reached, and obliging it to deal with his own ultimatum within the structure of confidence of Dail legitimacy.

In the realpolitik of the situation, Collins took the game into his own hands with that decision and he acted as if he knew it. He became the Provisional Government on British authority and built a new army with British support. The obvious purpose of his new army was to make war on the IRA, and he must have had that in mind if he said that by signing the Treaty he also signed his own death warrant. But he also seems to have thought that he could handle not only the IRA and the Dail, but also Whitehall. And that was where it all broke down. In the event he was Whitehall’s man. Whitehall was jubilant when it got him fighting the IRA.

It now seems to be agreed in official circles that the Anti-Treaty position in 1922 was undemocratic. I have learned to be careful about using the word ‘democracy’. In 1969 I made myself widely hated by pointing out that Partition was socially based. Then, around 1970, I wrote something about the Northern Ireland state being democratically valid. That was nonsense.

Northern Ireland was not a state and it had always been excluded from the democracy of the State of which it was part. But, hated though I was, nobody refuted me by pointing this out. I had to refute myself. And that taught me to be careful about democracy.

In January 1922 a Provisional Government was set up by Collins on British authority. Those who set it up might have had a small majority of Dail members for what they did, but it was not the Dail that set it up. Britain did not recognise the Dail as a sovereign authority after the Treaty any more than before it. The Provisional Government was established on British authority both de jure and de facto. And those in the Dail who supported it had to meet as the Parliament of Southern Ireland under the 1920 Act in order to set it up.

That Dail had been returned without a vote in the Summer of 1921. The Home Rule movement had withered away after its defeat in 1918, and no other party or individual contested the independence issue with Sinn Fein.

After the Treaty it was agreed that another election should be held quickly. In May 1922 an agreement was made that the election should not be contested between the Treaty and Anti-Treaty faction of Sinn Fein. The aim was to reproduce the existing balance of forces in the new Dail and establish a Coalition Government with a Treatyite majority. The Dail ratified this Agreement.

Collins was summoned to London and ordered to break it, which he did in ambiguous terms two days before the election.

The election had been delayed so that a Constitution for the Free State should be published for the information of the electorate. Collins tried to nudge it towards republicanism but this was vetoed by Whitehall. The draft Constitution acceptable to Whitehall was published on the morning of the election.

The Election Agreement ratified by the Dail was broken by Collins, sort of, but not quite. A substantial part of the voting was done on the assumption that it held. The Agreement provided for a Treatyite majority in any case, so the Treatyite majority was no surprise. The voting was not on a referendum proposal. It was the election of a Parliament to form a Government.

The Civil War was launched a few days after the Election. It was not launched on the authority of the Dail that had just been elected. If that Dail had met and the matter had been put to it, it is very unlikely that there would have been war.

The war was launched by the Provisional Government in response to yet another Whitehall ultimatum, threatening that the British Army would go into action if the Treatyite Army did not act promptly. The newly elected Dail did not meet until September, by which time the Free State Army was in command, the war was won, and all that remained to be done was the atrocities designed to burn the spirit of defeat into the souls of the defeated.

The most interesting book I know of about the war is by another Harrington, Niall C, the son of a Redmondite MP, who qualified as a chemist, joined the IRA, then joined the Medical Corps of the Treatyite Army and was present with it in Kerry in the Autumn of 1922. The book is Kerry Landing, published in 1992, and it tells how the Munster Republic was taken in the rear by means of a naval landing in Kerry. Harrington then had a long career in the Army before becoming the Organiser of the Federated Union of Employers in 1959. He died in 1981.

Leaving aside ideology about democracy, the book confirms the conclusions I came to forty years ago, so how could I not think it good! : e.g.—

“The Provisional Government had been in existence for almost six months… In that time, despite the toing and froing of opposing political and military heads, it was able to build resources and make emergency plans. It could keep its ‘front’ busy in talks, arguments and disagreements about maintaining the IRA as the nation’s volunteer army, while building and strengthening the new regular army. It had the means of doing what it wished to do, while observing very closely the growing aggressiveness of an opposition which spent its time thinking and talking, without agreeing on what was to be done or how to go about doing it. That was where the line of demarcation lay…” (p33)

On the constitutional situation brought about by the Treaty:

“Two Irish governments now functioned side by side… : the Dail Eireann Government… and the Provisional Government…

“In that confused and emotive period… not only were there two national governments…; there were also two national armies…, each giving allegiance to a republic, one to the “existing republic” proclaimed on Easter Monday 1916 and ratified by Dail Eireann…, the other to a republic to be achieved in time by the “stepping stone” of the Treaty…” (p7).

“Richard Mulcahy… was insisting that enlistment in the new army being formed by the Provisional Government was an engagement to serve in the “Regular Forces of the Republican Army”. This was illusory, of course; de facto it was the army of the Provisional Government that was being recruited; in other words, it was the Free State Army. The IRA who were against the Treaty… could claim that theirs was the true Republican Army, and so they did claim…” (p 10).

In an Appendix, from “unpublished documents”, Harrington gives a document by the “Chief of the General Staff”, apparently drawn up in early August 1922, which makes the following comment on the war and the Constitution:

“It is too early to say yet whether we could so establish ourselves [in “certain principal points” in Munster, BC] in time to have Parliament meet on 12th (August). I feel that we shall have to have another postponement…

“I consider that if Parliament did not meet until 24th our military position would be very favourable; we would have occupied sufficient additional posts in the South to dominate entirely the position there, and would be able to indicate so definitely our ability to deal with the military problem there that no parliamentary criticism of any kind could  seriously interfere with our ability” (pl64).

This was the parliament elected in June, that constituted the foundation of ‘democracy’ in 1922, but which had never met while democratic order was being imposed.

Brendan Clifford

Irish Volunteer Commemorative Organisation Memorabilia on Display

This post comes courtesy of the Irish Volunteers commemorative organisation,

http://irishvolunteers.org/

Hello all,

We have been asked to put up more pictures of memorabilia that we have on display around the country, please see the pictures below. These include Irish volunteer cap badges, Irish war of Independence medals ,1916 Rising medals , also firearms of the period. Do not forget that we will have a display and lecture on in cork city on July 8, see  http://irishvolunteers.org/exhibitions-commemorations/

1916 Rising medal cased and volunteer badge
1916 Rising Armband
IRA broom handle” peter the painter” c 96 mauser with but extension
cumann na mban brooch and cap badge
door handle GPO 1916 rising
Irish Volunteers Dublin Brigade cap Badge
IRA Prisoners fund badge
IRA black and tan medal with comrac bar and volunteer badge

IRA thompson sub- machine guns
IRA Volunteers “peter the painter”
IRA webley revolver

irish volunteer belt buckle
Irish volunteer c 96 broom handle
irish volunteer cap badge white metal
Irish volunteer cap badge
Irish volunteer cap badges
Irish volunteer insignia
Irish volunteer rifle lee enfield
irish volunteer rifle
irish volunteer trefoil
limerick brigade cap badge
mayo brigade cap badge
tipperary brigade cap badge
irish volunteer rifle

British Military Operations in Ireland-House of Commons Debate June 1921

Courtesy hansard.millbanksystems
1 June 1921 → Commons Sitting → ORDERS OF THE DAY.
MILITARY OPERATIONS, IRELAND.
HC Deb 01 June 1921 vol 142 cc1153-98 1153
Major-General SEELY I beg to move, “That this House do now adjourn.”
I move the Adjournment of the House to call attention to a definite matter of urgent public importance, namely, the failure of His Majesty’s Government to issue orders prohibiting the destruction of houses or buildings in Ireland except where necessary on purely military grounds, and the urgent necessity for putting a stop to such actions as the burning of Tincurry House, County Tipperary, on 15th May, The issue which I put to the House to-night is quite clear and definite, and has not been discussed by the House before. As will be seen, we raise here no question of the conduct of troops. There is no allegation here that the Regular troops, Auxiliaries or police have acted with lack of discipline. On the contrary, as will be seen from the concrete case which I shall put before the House, the troops throughout acted strictly in accordance with orders, and if I may use the phrase of so lamentable an occurrence, in an entirely proper manner. We raise two issues to-night. I can conceive that when the case is put, the great majority will support the view we express. We say, first, that His Majesty’s 1154 Government have failed to issue orders in accordance with the general principles laid down by my right hon. Friend the Chief Secretary in various answers to questions and various speeches in this House, namely, that there shall be no destruction of the homes of the people except on purely military grounds—that is to say, either when a house is used as cover for an ambush, or when the residents of the house may reasonably be supposed to be participators in the outrages which we so much deplore. Although that is the policy of my right hon. Friend, he does not see his way to issue definite orders to that effect, and one can gather from certain answers he has given that the view taken is that this must be left to the military authorities in a martial law area. That is the first point we definitely challenge. On a matter of high policy—there can be no higher policy than this—the Chief Secretary must be supreme, and so long as this House supports him his will in matters of high policy like this must be law.
The second point we challenge is the actual method adopted, namely, the destruction of people’s homes, presumably by way of reprisal, but in the absence of the incriminating reasons to which I have referred. As to the responsibility of the Chief Secretary to this House and his bounden duty to see that his policy and not the policy of anyone else is carried out, everyone here who cares for our method of constitutional government will 1155 be disposed to agree that the last word must rest with the Chief Secretary responsible to this House. He cannot shelter himself, and I trust he will not shelter himself, behind the supposed necessity of listening to the advice of anyone, whether soldier, policeman, or civilian in Ireland, who wishes to pursue a different policy. The second point is that we challenge the policy of the burning of people’s homes except for purely military necessities. The phrase I have used is, I think, a fair transcript of the policy of my right hon. Friend, as I understand it. It means that homes are to be destroyed only where a house is used as cover for an ambush or where the residents may reasonably be supposed to be parties to an outrage. The hon. and gallant Member opposite (Lieut.-Colonel Guinness), who, I under-stand, will second this Motion, holds the view that instead of “or” we should say “and” in the Motion. It will no doubt be urged that constantly the houses of loyalists will be destroyed because they will be deliberately used by our enemies as fortresses from which to fire, with a view to the houses being burnt down. My hon. and gallant Friend will develop that case. I will come to the concrete case on which I rest this Motion.
There is resident in Derbyshire a man whom I know very well and whom everyone knows, a Dr. Tobin, who has been a magistrate for about 20 years, who is universally respected, and who, for more years than I care to count, has been the foremost medical man in the central part of Derbyshire. I say all this to show that such a man may be reasonably supposed, and certainly supposed, to tell one nothing but the truth. I will read to the House his account of what took place, and as will be seen it is only one of many similar occurrences on the same day. I know the House will be shocked. This Dr. Tobin is the brother of a man who lived in Tincurry House. His brother is now dead and there remain the widow and a young daughter of 13 years. There were two nephews living there before the War. They both joined up as loyal subjects soon after the outbreak of war. One, a lieutenant in the Royal Flying Corps, was shot down in an aerial combat at Ypres; the other, an officer in the Royal Navy, was drowned in the operations at Gallipoli, while serving with His Majesty’s Ship “Triumph.” There were in the 1156 house at the time of the occurrence I shall describe, only Dr. Tobin’s sister-in-law and her little daughter. Two other children were at school. This is what happened. Dr. Tobin writes: Our old house and home in Ireland was blown up by the military on Saturday last, the 14th May, 1921—Tincurry House, Cahir, Co. Tipperary. It was an old country house, pre-Cromwellian, with additions and alterations from time to time. You can see it marked on any of the old ordnance maps. It was in occupation of my brother’s widow and her youngest daughter, 13 years of age. My brother died about 3 years ago. My brother’s two other children, 15 and 16½ years of age respectively, are away at school, one, a girl, in England, and the boy, 15 years of age, in Dublin. They, of course, go to the old home for school holidays only. No occupants of the house except the widow, Mrs. Marion Tobin, and her daughter, Eva, 13 years of age, and the servants. The widow writes me that on Saturday last the military arrived and gave her an hour’s notice to clear out her family, that the house was to be demolished. No furniture to be removed, only sufficient clothing, etc. No reasons given—nothing incriminating found, nor ever had been, though the house and plate had been searched and raided a dozen times or more night and day during the last 12 months or so. Before placing the bombs the house and all its rooms were thoroughly searched, and every article of furniture was smashed with picks and hatchets. The beds and bedroom furniture, as well as all the old mahogany chests, were all broken into matchwood. The new bathroom and bath and its basins, etc., were broken to bits. In fact, everything in the house upstairs and down was broken with picks and hatchets, so that nothing could possibly be saved or restored. Having thoroughly completed this wreckage, then the bombs were placed in the principal rooms and fired, and the dear old house and home blown to the four winds of heaven. Meanwhile, the widow and her little daughter, Eva Tobin, stood on the lawn as grim witnesses, carefully surrounded by the armed forces of the Crown. Incidentally this was also the home of my two nephews, who were killed in France and Gallipoli during the Great War. It seems that on the same day, 14th May, 11 other houses were demolished in the same beautiful valley of the Galtees, but none of them was as old or as big as Tincurry House—not that such a comparison is of the least consequence. In fact, it only goes to show how cruelly impartial and haphazard military reprisals are in Ireland. Then he proceeds to refer to the demeanour of the troops. He says they said it was a shame to treat the widow and the child in such a manner, and he goes on to say that when the deed was done the soldiers were exhausted for want of food and begged the widow to give them some, which she did. She and her 1157 servants made tea for them in the kitchen, and gave them a good feed. The house of this poor lady and her little daughter was deprived of its furniture and its contents, these were smashed and it was then blown up. It cannot be alleged that this lady or her daughter were participants in any outrage. It would seem unlikely that the home of two officers who fell fighting for us in the Great War would be the home of participants in outrages. It could not be used for the purposes of an ambush on the roadside, because I understand it is not on the road. What reason can be given for this action I do not know, but whatever reason may be given, I ask this House to say that such proceedings as these are wrong.
On the general question of these formal reprisals, I do ask the House to say that they wish to put an end definitely to this kind of thing. Whatever anybody else may say, this House should say: “This thing must stop,” and for more than one reason. The first reason, and the lower reason, is that it is so idle and inexpedient. It is very obvious that those on what may be called the loyal side of this matter, offer an incomparably bigger target. From the lower point of view it is foolish to take such steps as this, because brutal crimes have been committed, when the other side can burn down houses which are of so much more value—except, of course, from the sentimental point of view, to those immediately concerned. It is foolish for another and more important reason. Everybody must have been shocked this morning—and as one occupying an official position in Hampshire and having a close association with Hampshire, I was particularly shocked—at the news of the frightful crime by which the Hampshire Regiment, marching peace-fully along the road with its band, was blown up, and unfortunate bandsmen, some of them only little boys, blown to bits and many wounded. These are dreadful crimes which we reprobate, and to stop which we will help in every possible way. But are these crimes not made easier, instead of more difficult, by this kind of thing? In the first place, you must set more and more of the in-habitants against you by such procedure. The people, in what is here called the beautiful valley of the Galtees—and it 1158 is a most beautiful valley—may not have been all of one political view, but the great majority must have been on our side in reprobating murder. One can well imagine the bitterness of seeing one’s home destroyed, and by doing such acts you turn many of these people from being supporters of law and order, whatever their political views may be, towards the other side. Furthermore, and this is a view that will be shared in by many experienced soldiers, while troops are engaged on acts of this kind, they are necessarily withdrawn from their real duty, which should be to try to track down the assassin by every means known to the skilful and resourceful soldier. There is another aspect of this. Who is it orders these reprisals?
Lieut.-Colonel GUINNESS Not this House, anyway.
Lord H. CAVENDISH-BENTINCK Who ordered the torture of the prisoners the other day?
Major-General SEELY I should be glad if hon. Members would stick to this one point of who orders such reprisals as this. Other questions are contentious. I have taken the opposite side to many of my hon. Friends on the question of the behaviour of the troops, but this particular question I believe is one on which Members of the House on both sides will be of one mind. I repeat the question: Who orders these reprisals? There are two authorities and I know they do not pursue identical policies. I know in matters of this kind one favours one way and the other favours another. One commands the troops and the other commands the police. There is no proper co-ordination between them. Unless my right hon. Friend the Chief Secretary boldly says what is the policy to be carried out, he shall merely be regarded as the servant of both of these in carrying out this detestable policy at the behest of one of them or some other policy at the behest of the other. We want this question of authority made defintely plain if we are to avoid disastrous effects. We want one supreme civilian head, responsible to this House, and under him we want a man who will loyally obey his orders and who will be himself supreme over others. We want to know by whom different policies are authorised in the same area with these deplorable consequences. It may be said 1159 by somebody that while the destruction of property is very sad, it is nothing compared with the destruction of life. That is not quite true. It is a strange thing, but it is true that there are many people who love their homes even better than their lives, and when you seek to destroy people’s homes you cut deep down into vital things in human thought with consequences more far-reaching than you can deal with. I can prove this to the House from my own experience. This same policy was adopted for a brief period during the South African War. I happened to be there at the time when the farm-burning policy began. It lasted a very short time, for the almost unanimous opinion of all thoughtful soldiers, and certainly of the soldiers at the front condemned it, and it was abandoned.
§Colonel P. WILLIAMS And the present Prime Minister helped to kill it.
Major-General SEELY While it was going on, I happened to be there and with many others of the officers and men protested against it. We were more anxious than anybody to defeat our enemies if only for the sordid reason of getting home. But when in the course of an attack on a commando we burned down a house, and it was supposed that we were burning down the house of the man we were attacking, he, as a matter of fact, was very likely some determined free-booter from Cape Colony and probably nobody laughed more then he did when he saw the house go up to the sky, well knowing that probably it belonged to a sympathiser with our cause. The same thing is happening in Ireland. Do you suppose these brutal assassins who blew up the Hampshire Regiment cared one scrap for the burning of Tincurry House, the residence of these two officers who were killed on our side in the War? No; but I am quite sure they will go to Mrs. Tobin. I have no doubt they have gone to her and said to her, “You see what comes of being on the English side. You allowed your men protectors to go off to the War. You are proud that one should be an officer in the British Navy and the other an officer in the British Flying Corps, and they both get killed in fighting for their cause. What do you get for it? They come and burn your house down and blow your 400-years-old house to smithereens.” It is a foolish policy. The 1160 soldiers in South Africa protested against such a policy, but when that war was over, and when the task of reconciliation began, when all those who had been most bitter against each other were trying to come to an agreement, when great men like General Botha and Lord Milner were trying to repair the ravages of the war and bring back the South African Dutch to friendship with us, and to form, as we ultimately did, a South African Union under the British flag, what was the principal difficulty? General Botha told me himself, in the presence of my Liberal colleague of that day—and I have no doubt he must have told Conservative ex-Cabinet Ministers; in fact, I know he did—he said to me, “My chief difficulty in bringing about reconciliation, the difficulty that met me at every turn, the difficulty that at all stages and even at the very last nearly wrecked the scheme, was the bitterness of the men whose houses had been burned.”
Is not that a lesson for us here? Ought we not now at once to say from this House that this foolish and wrong policy of destroying people’s homes that they love for any reason short of the direst necessity shall be put a stop to? We hear a great deal of the hostility even now to an approach to better things in Ireland. I know there are forces at work, unexpected forces, which may bring about a reconciliation between what are after all two very brave and determined nations. Surely the first and the best step we can take, if there be any chance of reconciliation, is to say now, as from this House of Commons, and with the support of my right hon. Friend, “We will take charge of this; whatever else may be done, whatever it may be necessary to do, to track down assassins and prevent brutal murders and outrages which we all deplore, we will respect the homes of the Irish people and thus give an earnest of our intentions, that one day we may be reconciled with Ireland.”
Lieut.-Colonel W. GUINNESS I beg to second the Motion. I think everyone who has the interests of Ireland at heart must be grateful to the right hon. and gallant Gentleman for having brought this matter forward in the very temperate speech to which we have just listened, and if as a result of this Debate he can get some improvement in the military administration and greater wisdom in the 1161 action that the military authorities are now taking, I think he will be able to congratulate himself on having done work of enormous benefit to both countries. My hon. Friends and I have long urged that the suicidal contest of authority in Ireland between the civil and military powers should come to an end, and I listened to no part of the right hon. Gentleman’s speech with greater pleasure than to the words which he said on that matter and in favour of the whole of the responsibility for operations against the rebels in Ireland being put under one military guidance, but I am not going to elaborate that question now, because our views are very well known already. I want rather to deal with the smaller question of the burnings which have been taking place all over Ireland, and for which both sides are responsible. The right hon. Gentleman suggested that burnings might be right during military operations and where the owner or the occupant of the house might be reasonably suspected of being in sympathy with Sinn Fein—I am not quite sure of his exact words.
§Major-General SEELY Participators in outrages.
Lieut. – Colonel GUINNESS While there is no doubt that if a house is being occupied by people ambushing the troops of the Crown, the troops must be allowed to destroy that house if necessary during the action, I do not agree with the view that once the action is over the troops should be allowed to destroy even a house from which they have been fired at. If the action is finished there is no reason to have recourse to these violent methods. If there is just suspicion against the owner or occupier of the house, why not bring him before a court-martial and deal with him after hearing his case? If you do not discourage the troops from burning down houses after an action is over, you play into the hands of the Sinn Fein habit of selecting loyalist houses, the houses of men whom they are fighting, taking them aside and threatening them with violence if they make the slightest attempt to communicate with the Crown forces, knowing that by choosing such a house they are going a good way to work to get it destroyed by the friends of those who own it. I cannot give chapter and verse for that kind of case, but I can 1162 say that I have been told by officers in the Auxiliary Division that that is what happens, and they themselves, though they admit that in some cases it is necessary to destroy a house during the fighting, do not agree with the policy of burning a house down afterwards as a lesson to the population.
Now I come to the other case, where the right hon. Gentleman had, I think, the whole House with him, and that is where the house is burned down on the orders of the competent military authority in vengeance for some outrage upon the Crown forces. I think that is not only unjust, but most ineffective. It is absolutely repugnant, to anyone who is familiar with the conditions of British justice, that anyone should be punished unheard. The burning of property in this way is a very serious penalty, and, however anxious those who advise the competent military authority may be to select the right houses, it is inevitable that there must be mistakes. There is so much terrorism in Ireland to-day that I defy anybody to know which way the man who does not take an active part in politics on one side or the other really sympathises with. He dare not express his opinions, and how are the police, or whoever advise the competent military authority as to which houses are suitable to be burned down, to gauge the criminality of the owner? Of course, the military authorities probably take the line that this is a sound military method. I do not believe it is. As any soldier knew in the last War, it needs no military knowledge to inflict damage on the enemy if you do not care about the cost. A soldier must count the cost of his operation, and this particular government in Ireland is costing far more to your friends than it is to your enemies, and for that reason it seems to me absolutely suicidal. I do not think I can do better than read a letter which I got from a very well-known loyalist in the County of Cork: Can you do nothing to get the authorised military reprisals stopped? They are doing no good, and an infinity of harm; e.g., last Saturday night ‘Convamore,’ Lord Listowel’s house; ‘Ballywalter,’ Mr. Penrose Welsted’s, and ‘Rockmills,’ Mr. C. D. Oliver’s, all within a few miles of Castletownroche, in the Fermoy Military District, were burnt, I understand, as a counter-reprisal to the burning by the military of Sinn Fein houses in the neighbourhood. The Sinn Feiners have said so. The soldiers burn a cottage worth, perhaps, £300, and the Sinn 1163 Feiners retaliate by burning a house worth £50,000. I do not think £100,000 would pay for ‘Convamore’ and its contents. If the military reprisals go on, there will soon be no loyalists’ house left. The authorities do not appear to understand the state of the country even now. Soldiers expect country people to help them to bring criminals to justice. Under present conditions, this is too stupid. Everyone is terrorised. The Government can protect no one. If a man is even suspected of having given any information to the police, he is shot by the Sinn Feiners and labelled ‘spy.’ He adds as a postscript: I see that Listowel has applied for £150,000 compensation, and that a military proclamation has been posted about Fermoy that if the burning of loyalists’ houses is repeated, more than two Sinn Feiners’ houses for each will be destroyed. What is the good of destroying two houses, worth £300 apiece, which perhaps belong to a loyalist landlord, as vengeance for burning down a house worth £100,000? My friend adds: This will be regarded as mere bluff, which it is, and do more harm than good. I think it is mere bluff, because the other side in this matter hold the bigger cards. They can burn down houses which this House has to pay for, or else see the owner put to permanent loss, and the burning down of Sinn Feiners’ houses really inflicts no proportionate penalty upon the other side. There is another case which happened last week. Mr. Ebenezer Pike, of Kilcrenagh, County Cork, was on Thursday midnight awakened by people knocking up the house, and men came in and said he could have a quarter of an hour to clear out and take anything he liked. He is an old man. He was living with his daughter, and was so bewildered that, even if he had had more time, I do not suppose he could have taken all the valuable things away with him. Anyhow he lost both his house and all the valuables which it contained. He asked them why they were burning his house, as he had taken no part one way or the other, and he was told his house was to be burnt down as a reprisal for houses burnt down by the troops. He was then locked in the stable with his daughter, and when let out his house was in ruins. The competent military authority can do nothing to prevent such cases. It is they who order these reprisals, and I submit it is absolutely monstrous to go on with this policy, unless you are prepared to secure that it does not 1164 do more harm to your friends than it does to those against whom it is directed.
I say the competent military authority cannot protect loyalists’ houses, judging by their extraordinary performance last week in Dublin. They were not able to protect even the Customs House. I believe the competent military authority only a short time ago removed the guard from the Customs House, and it has not yet been explained in this House what induced them to pursue that fatuous policy. There had been a long controversy about that guard. They tried, I believe, to get the Auxiliaries to do it, but naturally the Auxiliaries are not a suitable kind of force to undertake work of that kind, and, finally, the military did find a small guard. They then proceeded to withdraw this guard altogether, with the result that the most important building, from the point of view of Government records, was burnt down in broad daylight. I agree it is a building which cannot be replaced. We have heard a lot about that, but we have not heard about the almost more valuable records and papers which perished in that building. If that happens in Dublin, where there are troops, and where there is a competent military authority on the spot, what must happen in the country districts to which I have referred? The competent military authority, who orders this kind of proceeding, perhaps bases his action on psychological grounds. If so, it shows a singular ignorance of Irish mentality.
This policy is driving the few friends this country had in Ireland into the arms of Sinn Fein. It is causing intense bitterness in the eyes of every man who has kept neutral, and it is causing disgust and fear among your friends. During the present nightmare everybody feels that whichever side he takes he has got an equal chance of having his house burnt down, but he knows that when this nightmare comes to an end, if he takes part against Sinn Fein, then when that party comes to govern the country, he is more likely to suffer. Therefore, it is only human nature if these unprotected men go over day by day and join the ranks of Sinn Fein. I say it is absolutely unfair to put this work upon your troops. My Noble Friend (Earl Winterton) was present when Auxiliary officers in Dublin in high command told us they detested this policy, that there was nothing their men 1165 disliked more than to get orders from the competent military authority to burn, in cold blood, houses, and turn out their occupants. I have given the right hon. Gentleman the reasons—one on the high ground of principle, and the other on the lower ground of expediency—why this policy should be stopped, and I hope he will choose either or both of them. I believe the right hon. Gentleman cannot know really what is going on.
Mr. MOSLEY Oh, yes he does!
Lieut.-Colonel GUINNESS I believe these orders must come on the decision of soldiers, who are guided only by the military expediency of the moment, and are thinking only in terms of force. They seem to forget that the country has got to be lived in after the Government has pacified it. I beg the right hon. Gentleman to bring this policy to an end, and while punishing murder to cease to inflict these penalties which, apart from causing senseless loss to the community, are stirring up bitterness in Ireland which will not die out in our lifetime.
Lord H. CAVENDISH-BENTINCK The speeches which have just been made are a remarkable testimony to the blundering and brutality of the Government’s rule in Ireland. The speech by my right hon. Friend the Member for Ilkeston (Major-General Seely), gives a very good instance of the crowning folly of the Government. Though I am deeply and bitterly opposed to the policy of His Majesty’s Government, I do not wish to approach this subject to-night in a violent or controversial spirit. I rise merely for the few moments I desire to address the House to beg the House and the Government to reflect whether there is any good to be obtained by the pursuance of a policy which has been pursued for the last two years. Take this question of burnings. What good really does the right hon. Gentleman think he is doing by burning the houses of people who, for all he knows, are perfectly innocent? Does he really think he is discouraging the rebels? Does he think he is detaching one single rebel from the Irish Republican Army? Does he think he is cowing the Irish people into submission? Is he not rather encouraging the rebels? Is he not rather adding to their ranks, and increasing the disgust and terror with which his rule is regarded in Ireland? As my hon. and 1166 gallant Friend opposite has said, the people in Ireland are not under the slightest delusion on this head. I was talking only the other day with a distinguished soldier who lives in Ireland, and he told me that for every cabin the right hon. Gentleman burns down the rebels burn down either a country house, or a mansion, or a castle. The only result of the right hon. Gentleman’s competition in arson is that he gets scored off in the end. After all, the burning down of the Dublin Customs House is only the logical outcome of his own competition. May I in all humility ask the House, and the Government, to take stock of where we are, and what we have achieved by our policy? We have got an army in Ireland of over 60,000 men, costing anything from £1,250,000 to £1,500,000. We have a body of police which, I believe, are costing £7,000,000. Property has been destroyed, I believe, to the amount of £5,000,000. You have lives lost to the number of 700 since 1st January. What have you got to show for it all? The right hon. Gentleman himself has confessed that the thing is a failure. The Prime Minister has also confessed that the right hon. Gentleman is a failure. The right hon. Gentleman knows very well that a commanding officer, when he is a failure, has to be removed to some other sphere of activity, and somebody else is put in his place. I submit it is high time that that which is a sound rule in military matters should be applied to the office of the right hon. Gentleman. The Prime Minister has announced that he is going to increase the number of soldiers in Ireland. What good is it going to do to increase the number of soldiers? What good has the army of 60,000 done? What has it done for peace?
§ 9.0 P.M.
§Mr. SPEAKER The Noble Lord forgets that in the Motion for the Adjournment of the House we are confined to the definite, urgent, and particular matter raised in it. The Debate was opened by the hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for the Ilkeston Division (Major-General Seely), but the Noble Lord must not review the whole field of Irish affairs; he must keep to the question—that of the burnings as set forth in the Motion.
Lord H. CAVENDISH-BENTINCK I am sorry I have strayed from the point. What I desire to say is that you are never going to get peace in Ireland by pursuing a policy of arson. The only way to get 1167 peace in Ireland is to do as in this country—to get the goodwill of the people. You will never get the goodwill of the people except you rely upon those principles upon which, at all events before the War, we relied in this country: that is to maintain the majesty of the law, and to promote the happiness and contentment of the people. You will only get peace in Ireland if you rely on those principles which underlie our religion and our great and glorious Empire. You are only going to get peace in Ireland when you have faith in the goodness of humanity and the efficiency and virtues of the principle of self-government. You are only going to get peace in Ireland when you cease your burning down of Irish houses, cease from bullying and knocking the people about, treat the Irish people as human beings, and leave liberty and self-government to do the rest.
The tragic part of the whole of this deplorable situation in Ireland is that the Irish people are asking for nothing more than that which I believe the British people are prepared to give them. They ask for nothing more than we have given the South Africans, the Canadians, and the Australians—that is, to make them a free country and a free people in the British Empire. I agree with the remarkably interesting article written by a very well-known gentleman in the “Round Table” the other day, that the only solution of this problem is to give the Irish people fiscal autonomy. There are, of course, risks in that policy. There are risks in any policy. The risk of the policy you are pursuing is that you have more and more added to the disgrace and dishonour of this country, and to the confusion and anarchy in Ireland. I do beg the Government to pursue a policy which is consistent with the traditions of this great and glorious Empire, and by which we can turn the Irish people, if we like, from rebels into happy and contented members of the British community.
Colonel ASHLEY I am sure the whole House was deeply impressed by the very excellent and moderate speech made by the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Major-General Seely). Above all they welcomed his speech because he very carefully kept it free from any extravagant utterances and any suspicion of party bias, which, Heaven knows, has been the ruin of Ire- 1168 land. He put before us what I am sure everybody in their heart of hearts agrees with, namely, that we wish to treat our Irish fellow-subjects in the same way, if possible, as people are treated here in England. He also bore truthful witness to the most excellent discipline maintained by the British forces in Ireland. Our soldiers have carried on under tremendous provocation. They have seen their fellow-men shot down from behind hedges, and they have seen them mutilated, and yet with very few exceptions thy have maintained a discipline which has always been characteristic of a British Tommy in all parts of the world. I hope the Chief Secretary will realise that in criticising this aspect of his administration we are not criticising the individual soldier who carries out his orders, but we are criticising simply the fact that such orders are given to him.
Let us be fair to the Chief Secretary and let us put ourselves in his position. The right hon. Gentleman was called to his task at a time when British authority was practically non-existent in Ireland. He had to reconstruct the Royal Irish Constabulary and strongly reinforce the Army. He had to deal with county councils and borough councils who had defied the British Crown, and, indeed, he had in a sense to reconquer Ireland for the British Crown and the British nation. Let us recognise, in justice to the right hon. Gentleman, the very grave difficulties which he has had to face, and also the large measure of success he has met with in his attempts to restore law and order. He has reconstituted the Royal Irish Constabulary, and there are few people who criticise that Constabulary now. Most of the county councils have agreed to acknowledge their authority, and outside the martial law area, generally speaking, in a very large measure law and order has been restored. Let us give credit where credit is due.
May I state why, in my humble opinion, the Chief Secretary and His Majesty’s Government have not more largely succeeded in bringing about a better state of affairs in Ireland? It is because of this policy of reprisals with official sanction. I understand that outside the martial law area reprisals have been abandoned. What is the root trouble of these reprisals in the martial law area? It is that we have not a civilian responsible to this House to direct policy, but 1169 that His Majesty’s Government have deliberately handed over in the martial law area not only executive action, but policy, to soldiers. I do not wish to criticise a distinguished general, but he is trained to do a certain thing in order to win battles, destroy the enemy and the armed forces of his enemy. He has not to consider the consequences of those actions. It may be right to do these things in a foreign country, but it is all wrong to do them in our own country where the people have to live together. This policy of reprisals which is being permitted by the Government to be carried out by the competent military authority is, in my opinion, the reason why my right hon. Friend’s policy has not been more successful, although I know he has worked very hard. As a humble Back Bench Member, may I urge the Government at once to take steps to bring their policy in the martial law area into line with their policy outside, which is that these official reprisals, except under the circumstances named by my right hon. Friend, shall cease at once and cease altogether.
With regard to Ireland, I have connections out there, and I do feel most deeply that we should do all we can to bring about reconciliation in Ireland, and these reprisals are an absolute bar to any idea of reconciliation. They are against all the laws taught us in the Bible; they are against the laws of God and all the laws we have held sacred in this country in the past; they are against all our constitutional practice which has made this country great and has made up our Empire. They have proved themselves to be actually ineffectual, and if a thing is ineffectual you had better scrap it. Last but not least, this policy has given our enemies in foreign countries occasion to say very unpleasant things about this country which certainly have a very sound substratum of truth. After all, this House claims, and always has claimed, to be the controlling authority in this country. I am sure anybody listening to the cheers of hon. Members when they hear these sound principles being laid down must realise that every-body here is unanimous that these things are wrong and must cease. If that is so, may I ask the Chief Secretary to at once see that the competent military authorities in martial law areas shall cease these official reprisals, and if any more 1170 take place let him see that the military authorities in those areas shall at once be removed.
§Earl WINTERTON I am aware that on this question I have very strong feelings, which are not shared by hon. Gentlemen opposite, and I do not wish to travel outside the limits which have been set by the right hon. Gentleman in the persuasive speech with which he opened this Debate. May I state here that I regret I was led to use some disorderly expression a short time ago when we were discussing another aspect of this question. The only quarrel I have on this occasion is that the Noble Lord the Member for South Nottingham (Lord H. Cavendish-Bentinck) introduced matter which seemed to me to be somewhat extraneous to this Resolution. I do not know that my views upon the action of the Government in Ireland are of much interest to the House, but I have always been in favour of taking the strongest military action, because the situation is at such a pitch in Ireland that it can only be settled by force of arms. That is my private view. I have always taken the view, and it requires some boldness to put it forward, that certain issues in Ireland can only be decided by force of arms. I do not mean the whole issue as between the Irish people and this country. I am referring to the issue as between those who commit assassination and the armed forces of the Crown. Clearly an immense number of the people of this country agree that the Government have to take military action, but I cannot conceive anything more serious than to have to take military action against any portion of the inhabitants of the United Kingdom.
What is inconceivable to me with my knowledge of the state of affairs is that there should be so much apathy and indifference on the part of this House in the treatment of this question. We have neither the Leader of the House nor the Prime Minister here. It is inconceivable that the Front Bench should be occupied as it is at this moment. Every Member of the Government ought to be present. It is all very well for the Home Secretary to smile. I can assure him that nobody in Ireland smiles at the situation or at the action which the Government has taken there. All over Ireland it will be mentioned that, on the occasion of a 1171 Debate in which there is a remarkable unanimity of opinion on a particular question, neither the Leader of the House nor the Prime Minister attended, and the only contribution made by the Home Secretary was a feeble smile. Those who hold the views I do will agree that if military action is taken it should be sharp, short, and effective. It is intolerable that you should continue to carry on a dragging guerilla warfare. If the right hon. Gentleman’s Chief Secretaryship does not succeed he should give way and make room for someone else, and so, too, should Sir Nevil Macready. How long has this guerilla warfare been going on, and how many more years will it continue before it is brought to an end? So much for the general aspect of the policy.
On the particular question of the burnings I repeat that anyone holding the views I do will demand that military action shall be sharp and effective. Can the right hon. Gentleman maintain for one moment that the burning of Condamore, the property of a family whose loyalty nobody questions, is going to have the slightest effect in stopping assassination? Of course, it will not. I cannot conceive why such action has been taken at all, except on the ground that the military policy of the Government in the South of Ireland has largely failed up to the present. It has failed because we have not sufficiently good leaders. Look at the kind of gentlemen who are supposed to be competent military authorities in the South of Ireland. Some of them would certainly never have commanded a brigade in the War. Some who did so were sent home. Surely the right hon. Gentleman should select for the difficult and delicate task which the troops in Ireland have to undertake the very best men available. There are men like the gallant and distinguished officer in command of the Archangel Expedition. There are men who in the War did difficult and delicate work, quite as difficult and as delicate as anything requiring to be done in Ireland, who might have been chosen. It was absurd to choose such men as have been selected for the work. I know what the usual line of defence of the right hon. Gentleman is, but I want to see our gallant soldiers led by competent leaders and not by men who would be better if sent back 1172 to their comrades at the War Office. You want for this kind of work the very best men possible, and I am sure if you had such men in charge they would not for one moment be in favour of the policy which is being pursued, or, at any rate, they would not carry it out without making strong recommendations to the contrary.
I want to put three questions to the Government. In the first place who gives the orders for individual reprisal burnings? Who, for instance, gave it in the case of the house to which reference has been made this evening? Was it General Strickland? Was it a brigade commander? Was it the colonel in charge of the battalion? Or who was it? It is not necessary for the right hon. Gentleman to mention the actual name of the officer, but we want to know what is the rank of the officer who is responsible for giving the orders.
§Lieut. – Commander KENWORTHY And to what branch of the Service he belongs.
§Earl WINTERTON I do not think that that is important. We know the policy is carried out by the military. I have always refrained from asking questions which, I think, might be mischievous, but I feel it is desirable, in view of what is gong on in the South of Ireland, that we should know exactly under what law or regulation these burnings are carried out. Are they carried out under martial law, or are they carried out under civil law? Is there any process by which the person who owns the property—it is only by the mercy of the Almighty that I own none in the South of Ireland—can protect himself or by which he can claim compensation if he thinks his horse has been improperly burned? Is there any channel through which he can make an appeal? Even in the case of an enemy country, say in the occupied districts of Germany, persons thinking themselves aggrieved by any action of the Allied troops have the fullest opportunity for appeal to some tribunal. Finally, I would like to know, is the right hon. Gentleman in a position to review in any way these burnings after they have been carried out and to consider the effect of them and the reason for them? A most serious charge was made by the last speaker. He said, and it was news to me, 1173 that the Chief Secretary has no control or power over what is done by the constituted military authorities. If that is so, I say frankly it alters my view of the whole subject. I am inclined to think that a larger portion of Ireland may have to be brought under martial law than is at present the case, and if the military authorities are to be made entirely responsible there ought to be some channel by which the Government in this country can be made fully aware of all the circumstances under which reprisals are carried out. That is to say, where there is a case—and I think the House will assent to this—in which there is a question whether there was any reason why a burning should have taken place as, for example, the case mentioned by the right hon. Gentleman who initiated the Debate—the Chief Secretary should have the fullest opportunity at the earliest possible moment of deciding whether the action of the Crown forces in Ireland was justified or not. Seeing that that is not so, he is placed in a very unfortunate position. At Question Time to-day he was subjected by hon. Gentlemen opposite to an attack upon him personally for his administration in Ireland. Quite obviously, if he is not responsible for that administration, it is unfair to attack him, but somebody must be responsible. I hope the right hon. Gentleman will answer that question, and will give us an assurance that in the last resort and quickly, he is responsible, and is in full possession of the facts. I am bound to confess that, if he is fully responsible I think it will require very great parliamentary dexterity on his part, which I know he possesses, to make out a good case for such burnings as those mentioned in the course of this Debate, and for the continuation of those burnings, whether on a smaller or a larger scale, in the South of Ireland.
§Mr. MOSLEY I fear that the Noble Lord was rather more than half way on the road to Damascus before he saw the great light. Things being as they are, however, may I hope that in the near future those of us who have wandered forth into the desert on this subject may have the opportunity of offering him a respectful welcome. A pang of regret inspired me to-night in listening to some of the speeches of hon. Members opposite. I wish we could have commanded such support in October last, when we ven 1174 tured to protest against the sacking of Balbriggan when a whole community was destroyed by the agents of the right hon. Gentleman in the middle of the night, without even the warning that is extended under the system of official reprisals; against a reprisal that resulted in two women in child-birth and four little children suffering from measles perishing in the cold of the fields. I wish that, on that occasion, when we ventured to protest against a policy which far transcends anything mentioned in this Motion, we could have commanded the support of hon. Members. I quite realise, however, that it is inexpedient on this occasion that I should wander into the wider issues raised by such considerations. The right hon. Gentleman will certainly answer one day at the bar of history for these proceedings. I trust he may one day answer before a tribunal of his fellow-countrymen, but I have no wish to raise any controversy beyond the Motion advanced by my right hon. Friend this evening.
Unofficial reprisals, privately inspired and subsequently condoned, we are told, are at an end. To-day we find ourselves in the era of official reprisals. They began, as far as I understand, on the 27th April last, when, in Listowel, a proclamation was posted by the military stating that in future reprisals for any outbreak against the lives and property of officials would be taken against the property of selected persons without proof of their implication in the outrage. That, I understand, is in direct contravention of the right hon. Gentleman’s previous assurances in this House that, in all cases of official reprisals where houses were burned down, there should be at least very good grounds of suspicion that the inhabitants of those houses were actually implicated in the outrages which instituted the reprisals. We now find the right hon. Gentleman quite frankly moulding his policy on the Prussian model. This policy is copied and taken en bloc from the doctrines of the German military writers which were closely pursued by that nation throughout the War. It is the old, well-known system, outlined in the doctrines of Clauswitz and others, of collective punishment. The principle is that if an outrage is committed in the neighbourhood where the troops of a hostile country are billeted, and the inhabitants of that 1175 neighbourhood support and sympathise with the assassins, and consequently information cannot be obtained, an indiscriminate vengeance should be wreaked on the locality and that the sins of the guilty should fall on the innocent in the hope that a blind shot would catch the guilty party and thus discourage potential assassins in the future.
In Belgium, during the War, that system worked. I am dealing with it purely pragmatically; it is no use to appeal to the right hon. Gentleman on any other ground. That system worked in Germany because the Germans were efficient. The right hon. Gentleman is not efficient. If it did not carry such a ghastly tragedy in its wake his administration in Ireland would be the joke of history. The Prussians in Belgium were able to prevent the people travelling from one village to another. The people were segregated, the men were forced to remain in the villages in which they were born, and under the military system of Germany they could not wander about the country. Consequently, if a village were sacked when outrages took place against the Germans, and the outrages had been committed by a Belgian, then that Belgian knew that his own native community would be destroyed, and that probably his own mother, sisters, wife or children would have their house burned over their heads. Consequently he was deterred from committing what were crimes in the eyes of the Germans. Those conditions do not prevail at all in Ireland. The right hon. Gentleman is entirely incompetent to prevent Irish assassins travelling from one end of the country to another. They do it at will, as he has assured us over and over again in this House. They are not living in the villages, but on the bogs and in the hills, on the run, and his administration can never get them.
Therefore, what conceivable object is there in this inefficient reproduction of Prussianism? The only effect it can have is once more to give Sinn Fein the propaganda that it needs in America. The news of these acts are cabled to the United States and more money pours into the coffers of Sinn Fein. I agree with the right hon. Gentleman who moved this Motion that, so far from being deterred by these outrages, the active, militant band of Sinn Fein are delighted 1176 when they see the houses of innocent people burned down. The right hon. Gentleman is merely visiting the spleen of his inefficiency, because he cannot catch the guilty, upon the heads of the innocent. That is the system which the right hon. Gentleman is constituting in Ireland. It is not even an efficient Prussianism. That is the system which has to-day evoked against this country a howl of indignation all over the world, our own Colonies included—a howl of indignation which eclipses the indignation felt against the Germans in regard to their action in Belgium. The right hon. Gentleman has attempted a task which has defeated infinitely greater men than himself. Napoleon attempted a system not nearly so onerous as the right hon. Gentleman’s in Ireland, not nearly so repressive, but the same kind of thing—visiting the sins of the guilty upon the innocent, collective punishment, militarist repression. He tried that in Germany and in Spain, and the national sentiment which he conjured up in those countries was responsible for his downfall in 1814. It broke Napoleon, and it has broken already the Chief Secretary for Ireland. The same system was employed by the Austrians in Italy, and it was entirely responsible for the creation of Italian nationality. Indeed, the only way of creating nationality, in these days of economic internationalism, is by political repression of this sort. The right hon. Gentleman is perpetuating that disastrous, exaggerated, egotistical nationalism in Ireland which is responsible for all our difficulties there to-day. He cannot claim that his administration has been a success. He cannot claim at the best that it is anything but a feeble imitation of his Prussian model. He cannot claim that he has not brought upon the name of this country abroad an execration which will live throughout this generation. He cannot even have the courage to submit the whole question to an impartial tribunal of his fellow-countrymen.
§Mr. CLYNES All of the speeches to which the House has listened in this short Debate have been very brief, and in that I propose to imitate them, but I cannot hope to imitate them in their fervour and in the qualities of eloquent appeal which have distinguished them among most of the speeches that we have heard for a very long time on Irish questions. I cannot 1177 hope, either, that we shall have any proof to-night that the Chief Secretary will have learned anything from the lessons of history. Indeed, had this country been capable of learning anything from the lessons of history in relation to Irish government, we should not now be debating this aspect of the Irish Question which my right hon. Friend has brought before us. I rise mainly to suggest to the Chief Secretary that he should keep faith in his answer to-night with the definite assurance, which he has often repeated, with regard to the discharge of his duties. He has assured the House that he would continue to discharge his duty, as he saw that duty, so long as he should have the support of the House of Commons. There have been some half-dozen speeches since this Debate began, and each one of them has been an appeal to the right hon. Gentleman at least to depart from or reverse one part of his settled military policy in the martial law area. Not a single hon. Member has said a word in support of that policy. On the contrary, every hon. Member who has so far addressed the House has reflected what I am certain is the view of every man who hears this case stated. We put to the right hon. Gentleman the view that this line of trying to govern Ireland is not supported by the House of Commons, and is not in keeping with the collective will of the Members of this House of all parties. It is clear that no one, unless it be, perhaps, the right hon. Gentleman himself, will rise in defence of what is now being done.
If we cannot say anything whatever for a particular line of military action or civil government in Ireland, we ought, at least, to be able to claim for it that it has the support of the majority of this House. Apparently, this particular part or feature of Irish policy has no support here whatever, and I claim that on that ground the Chief Secretary is no longer entitled to continue this method of governing Ireland in the martial law area. There is, perhaps, a stronger reason why it should be discontinued. I can only reinforce the reason which has been so eloquently expressed by the two or three hon. Gentlemen who have preceded me. It is futile and wicked to inflict such severe physical privation and loss upon innocent people. You could, perhaps, justify the wickedness and wrong on the ground that the 1178 end justifies the means, if it could be shown that this plan had been a success. It has not, and, for my part, I hope it will not. But I cannot conceive of any line upon which conduct of this kind on the part of a civilised Government can be excused or defended. Some of us who have expressed ourselves strongly on some features of Irish government have been reproached on occasion with the statement that what we say is an encouragement to the commission of crime and to wrongdoing in Ireland. On the contrary, I believe that the continuance of the methods to which we are now objecting is the most express and assured encouragement that could be given to those who find the justification for their acts in the very act of the Government itself.
Nothing will please the extremists, the rebels, the physical force element in Ireland more than to know that this particular line of Irish policy is to be continued by the British Government. That will strengthen any act of rebellion or reprisal that they may be disposed to take. It is, therefore, not only wrong and unjust to the innocent sufferers, but it strengthens the hands of the rebels who, on the other hand, are being pursued by the right hon. Gentleman with a view to their destruction. I have only risen to associate myself and those for whom I can speak with the expressions of opinion which have been couched in such terms of melancholy with regard to the outlook in Ireland. We are possessed by a feeling of the greatest dejection and bewilderment as to where we are being led. I can recall when, 12 months ago, the right hon. Gentleman joyously expected that after a few months, by a show of military strength or increased police forces, he would be able to claim a success for his policy. He has recently confessed that it is a failure—at least that it is a failure up to a point of time within which he concluded that he would meet with success. Whatever he thinks he may have in store for the broad lines of his policy, he surely cannot hope for any elements of success whatever from the particular line against which this Motion is directed. I ask his attention to the fact that this line of policy is unanimously reprobated and condemned by Members of this House attached to all parties, and, in keeping with his own declarations in his previous speeches, his announcement to the House ought to be that of a depar- 1179 ture from a policy which has been ruinous so far as it has been tried.
§Mr. LANE-MITCHELL I have a feeling that it is imprudent for a new Member who has never before spoken on the Irish Question to intervene in a discussion of this kind, because we have been accustomed so often to hear the same men repeat the same speech that we do not take it seriously. We send a soldier over to Ireland to do our job. I want to know how we are supporting him in doing it. If I had charge of a job of this kind I should select the best man I could get and give him all the force he wanted to do it, and give him all the backing he wanted, and if he did not do it I would clear him out and get someone else. I want the job done. What do I mean by the job? It is not the kind of Parliament Ireland is going to get. It is not a question of self-government. That is not what is before you now. What is before you is that ever since this Parliament came into being you have had rebellion in Ireland, and you have been tinkering with it from one time to another, and every time any force has been sent to put it down you start to weaken the hand that is doing it and do all you can to stop it being brought about.
Lieut.-Colonel GUINNESS We want troops to put down murder.
§Mr. LANE-MITCHELL You have all criticised the Government.
§Earl WINTERTON Will the hon. Member allow me to interrupt?
§Mr. DEPUTY-SPEAKER (Mr. James Hope) The Noble Lord has already spoken. Now we are getting another view.
§Mr. LANE-MITCHELL I am in absolute agreement with the Noble Lord that we have to get on with it and get it done somehow or another. It has been established in the discussion that in the military area the competent military authority is supreme, and he acts on his own authority, independent of the Chief Secretary. The right hon. Gentleman (Major-General Seely) asked definitely whether a specific order was given for a reprisal by the Chief Secretary. I have gathered that the Chief Secretary never gives an order for reprisals. It comes from the com- 1180 petent military authority, the man who was sent there to do the job, who in the exercise of his judgment does it in a particular way. Outside the military area the Chief Secretary has been ruthlessly putting down any attempt at reprisals. If that is the position what more do you want? The House has a right to say that until we get law and order restored in Ireland every man of right mind ought to support the military authority over there in getting the job done.
§Lord EUSTACE PERCy In rising to address the House for the first time I should, perhaps, apologise for intervening in a Debate on so serious a question, but after the speech to which we have just listened I feel especially that some reply is needed and that perhaps a reply will come not unfittingly from someone who has just had to fight an election and has been elected as a supporter of the Government. In my election address I strongly supported the necessity of holding up the hands of the Government in enforcing the authority of the Crown in Ireland, and I am perfectly prepared to trust the man chosen by this House to enforce law and order in Ireland. But I also said in my election address that it was absolutely necessary to have unity of command. I do not understand how the right of this House to inquire into the facts, which we are now doing, can be put off by a kind of House-that-Jack-Built policy, that because the Chief Secretary has appointed some-one else who has appointed someone else to be responsible for a particular area, therefore we must not ask the Chief Secretary for an explanation or hold him responsible for what occurs in that area. If I may give my impression of what the actual feeling in this country is at present about the situation in Ireland, a very humble impression gathered only from a somewhat recent experience, I have always found very little support in the country for the extreme view of the moral obliquity of the Government. Still less have I found any support for the view of their moral obliquity and indiscipline of the soldiers of the Crown. The position of the Government in regard to this question would have been very much less strong than it is to-day if some of its opponents had not so constantly delivered these extreme attacks upon them.
1181 What I did find was a strong feeling that the administrative system of restoring order in Ireland has been incoherent, and therefore weak. It is because 1, and I believe all those who sit near me, are anxious to strengthen the hands of the Government that we ask whether the present system of a divided command in Ireland, as manifested in these reprisals, these burnings of homes, is a system to which the Government can point as a coherent system adapted to the restoration of order, nay, I would put it even as implying a coherent system adapted to bring pressure upon those upon whom you wish to bring pressure. The whole point of repression must always be that it shall proceed with the greatest possible precision, and that therefore those at whom you strike shall know for what offence you have struck and why it is they who are struck and not someone else. If there be anything incoherent or hap-hazard or indiscriminate in the action of a repressive authority, it will not repress, and it is from that point of view that I have intervened to say that if the right hon. Gentleman can convince this House that the system of administration is so conducted, under such centralised control, under such a tight rein, that it can be directed to certain definite ends of repression, then I shall be prepared to support the Government. If, as I fear, it is a question of incoherence of administration, resulting in indiscriminateness of repression, then I think there is only one course before anyone who gave the election pledges which I gave, on the one hand to support the Government in suppressing disorder, and on the other hand to see that the administration for that purpose reaches the highest possible level of efficiency.
§The CHIEF SECRETARY for IRELAND (Colonel Sir Hamar Greenwood) I congratulate the Noble Lord who has just spoken on his success at the poll, and on taking part in our Debate on a very vital issue such as that raised to-night. I appreciate very much what he has said, and in principle I am absolutely in agreement with him. I appreciate the temperate and effective speech of the right hon. and gallant Gentleman who moved the Resolution (Major-General Seely). There is nothing in this Resolution, in substance, which I have not already acted upon, or could not accept. Before I deal with the Resolution, however, may I refer 1182 to those hon. Gentlemen who spoke of officers, I think most unfairly. I must make a protest against calling the Competent Military Authority of Dublin an incompetent military authority, and against the suggestion that certain competent officers in the martial law area are not fit for their command. Those officers cannot answer except through me. If they are incompetent they must be removed; but to make an accusation of incompetence, without any proof whatever—
Lieut.-Colonel GUINNESS The right hon. Gentleman says that I made an accusation of incompetence without proof. If he can explain why the military guard was withdrawn from the Customs House after many representations and many negotiations had gone on I will gladly withdraw my expression.
§Earl WINTERTON If the right hon. Gentleman will undertake to find out who is responsible for the situation by which a band was blown up in the South of Ireland, and no precaution taken to send an advance guard to look at the road beforehand, I will withdraw my accusation against the competent military authority in the South of Ireland.
§ 10.0 P.M.
§Sir H. GREENWOOD I think these two questions are quite irrelevant to the Resolution, but I will deal with them The Customs House in Dublin had no special guard except the ordinary military and police patrol, for various reasons. In the first place the number of troops in Ireland is so short of requirements that it is impossible to provide guards for all public buildings. That is a military consideration. In the second place it was not considered credible that even the extremist Sinn Feiner would burn this great national possession, namely, the Customs House. They have burned it, and the loss will fall on Ireland and nowhere else. I do not consider in these circumstances that the competent military officer in Dublin can be accused of incompetence. I still say that it is a most unfair slur on an officer who can only speak through me. I am satisfied that he is one of the ablest officers in the British Army. Although there have been many brutal murders in Dublin, including the murder of 12 officers one morning, on November 21st last, so great was the control of that officer over the soldiers and the police under him that 1183 there has never been a reprisal of any shape or kind.
§Lieut. – Commander KENWORTHY Croke Park!
§Sir H. GREENWOOD As to the question of the blowing up of the band and some soldiers of the gallant Hampshire Regiment at Youghal, I can assure the Noble Lord that if it is a test of the competency of the commander at Cork I have no doubt that every precaution was made to find out whether the way was clear for the advance of the battalion that was marching towards the rifle butts, and I do not think it is a sign of incompetency in a General Officer if a concealed mine is exploded by an electric wire, running from a battery 60 or 70 yards away from the road. I do not think that is a sign of an incompetent officer.
§Earl WINTERTON Was there an advanced guard?
§Major-General Sir NEWTON MOORE They would not have found it if there had been.
§Sir H. GREENWOOD I have no doubt that the regiment was marching according to rule in an area such as Youghal. I have no evidence to the contrary. With reference to the officers of the police and the military, I am responsible for them and their conduct, and I am sure the House will agree with me that if things are wrong I must take the blame, which I do cheerfully, and I am proud of it. [HON. MEMBERS: “Oh!”] Yes, and on balance the record of these men in Ireland will shine brightly in the history of this country. That brings me to a very important point of principle raised by the right hon. Gentleman, namely: “Is the Chief Secretary responsible for everything that goes on in Ireland?” He is. Let there be no doubt about that. I am responsible. In the normal way when a part of a country is under martial law the officer commanding is the sole authority and is responsible to the Secretary of State for War, but in this case I am responsible. Let there be no doubt about that. Therefore, if any military or other officer is incompetent it is my business to dismiss him, and if the House feels strongly that anyone is not competent and is not dismissed they must vent their displeasure on me. I think that is the 1184 proper constitutional position. It adds to my difficulties, but it is essential that the Chief Secretary should speak for the whole of Ireland, of which he is the representative in this House.
On the point of unity of command in the martial law area there is absolute unity of command under the senior officer, General Sir Peter Strickland. He has absolute command over civilians, police, and military. There is no question about that. He can deal with them exactly as he likes, under the proclamation agreed to by the Commander-in-Chief and myself. Of course, all proclamations issued by the Commander-in-Chief are issued in agreement with myself. As to unity of command in the rest of the country that is only possible under martial law. The question of the extension of martial law is frequently before the Government. It may be necessary to extend the martial law area. It may not be necessary. We have had two Parliaments elected in Ireland since we last had an Irish Debate. That is an historical constitutional event. The authority given under the Government of Ireland Act will soon, I hope, pass to the two Parliaments in Ireland. The Ulster Parliament has been elected, and will be constituted in a very short time and will operate. It would be impossible to extend martial law to that area without the consent of that Parliament. I still hope that the Southern Parliament will meet and operate. At any rate, it is our business to give them the opportunity to do so. If they fail to take advantage of that opportunity and assume responsibility for the good government of Ireland, a new set of circumstances arise, and the Government must simply in these circumstances apply all the remedies in their possession. So when we are pressed for unity of command and drastic measures, while I appreciate the feelings of hon. and right hon. Members they must remember that we have the political remedy in Ireland and we must give that remedy an opportunity to operate.
§Lord H. CAVENDISH-BENTINCK There is nothing to prevent you stopping burning down houses.
§Sir H. GREENWOOD The Noble Lord the Member for Horsham (Earl Winterton) asked who gives the order for official reprisals in the martial law area. 1185 The answer is no officer below the rank of Brigade Commander.
§Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHY On whose advice?
§Sir H. GREENWOOD He acts on the advice of those serving under him.
§Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHY Is not the actual advice as to whose houses are to be burned given by the Intelligence Department? Is that a military department or a civil department?
§Sir H. GREENWOOD He must get his advice where he can, and will only act On it when he is convinced that it is good. Every military area has its Intelligence staff, but who are the particular person or persons on whose advice the Brigade Commander will act it is impossible to say. The second question is—is there any review of the what are called official reprisals by the Commander-in-Chief and by myself? There is a review of them. They are treated as most serious and abnormal acts, and I must say here if there is any case where innocent persons have suffered by reason of the orders given by a Brigade Commander I certainly would consider that that was a case for compensation out of the Exchequer.
§Captain W. BENN For loss of life?
§Sir H. GREENWOOD As far as you can compensate for that by money. That is the one irrevocable thing; but the hon. and gallant Gentleman knows that life is not involved in what we are considering to-night. The report goes at once from the Brigade Commander to the Divisional Commander in Cork. From that commander it is sent on to General Head-quarters in Dublin, to the General Officer Commanding in Dublin, General Sir Nevil Macready. He and I are in daily contact when we are in Ireland together, and we are in constant contact when I am here and he is in Ireland.
§Earl WINTERTON Are these reprisals taken under martial law or under the ordinary law—the Restoration of Order Act?
§Sir H. GREENWOOD I will develop that as I go on. I am dealing with reprisals in the martial law area. The Resolution before the House is to move the adjournment to call attention to a, definite matter of urgent public importance, namely, the failure of the military 1186 authorities to issue orders prohibiting the destruction of houses and buildings by Crown forces in Ireland, except where necessary on purely military grounds. There is nothing in the substance of that which I do not accept. Orders have been issued to servants of the Crown and I shall read an Order which was issued to the police and agreed to by myself not recently but on 4th December last year: There have been recently large numbers of reports of arson. While it is by no means clear that this is done by forces of the Crown I wish again to impress on all members of the police force the absolute necessity for stopping burnings, whatever the provocation. The only profitable burnings are the destruction of buildings which have been used to shelter ambushers or from which fire is opened on forces of the Crown. The burning of houses or buildings not directly connected with assassination or attempted assassination is indefensible. I appeal to the police of all ranks to repress all destruction of property in Ireland, even of notorious Sinn Feiners. The force will now fully recognise that the Government is giving them strong support, and I feel sure that they will not wish to embarrass the Government in their very difficult task. I can assure them that incendiarism tends to alienate sympathy of many right thinking and law abiding citizens of the Empire, and does harm to the cause of right for which we are fighting.
§Colonel ASHLEY Does that apply to the martial law area?
§Sir H. GREENWOOD To all Ireland.
§Mr. LUNN How far is that efficacious? Is it not the fact that Cork City was burned down six days after the issue of the Proclamation?
§Sir H. GREENWOOD It is very easy when a country is in a state of rebellion to find exceptions to every rule. I am dealing with the question in the Resolution about the Government failing to issue Orders prohibiting the destruction of houses or buildings. This Order was issued to the police on 4th December last year for the whole of Ireland.
§Major-General SEELY In order that we may not proceed on different lines of thought, does the right hon. Gentleman mean to explain whether this Order of 4th December applies to the martial law area under General Strickland?
§Sir H. GREENWOOD I will deal with that. This Order shows that the right hon. and gallant Gentleman is in error when he says that the Government has not issued any Order. The Government has. I have said at this Box time and again, in reference to reprisals, that no 1187 one has tried more strenuously than I have to put them down, and I think that I have succeeded in doing so. [HON. MEMBERS: “Resign!”]
Lieut.-Colonel GUINNESS rose—
§Mr. SPEAKER We have had no fewer than eight speeches in criticism of the Government, and it is only fair that the Government should be allowed to put its case without interruption.
Lieut.-Colonel GUINNESS May I ask whether this Order did not deal merely with unofficial reprisals, as to which we all recognise the strong action which the right hon. Gentleman has taken, while we are now dealing with official reprisals by order of the competent military authority.
§Mr. SPEAKER Hon. Members should give the right hon. Gentleman an opportunity to develop a continuous argument. They all seem to want to get their points in. He should have a chance.
§Sir H. GREENWOOD The Irish Secretary is accustomed to be shot at. I quite understand the keenness with which everybody is using this question, but I am developing it and I will cover all the points that have been raised. I have to repeat that the right hon. Gentleman is wrong in his first hypothesis, namely, that the Government has not dealt with this question by order. This was issued on 4th December of last year. Martial law was imposed upon four counties, I think, on 10th December of last year, and on four further counties in January of this year. In the non-martial law area, which comprises the greater part of Ireland, there have never been official reprisals. Reprisals have never been encouraged or condoned, but have always been condemned, and many people have been severely disciplined because of unofficial reprisals, although the provocation has been almost superhuman. In spite of that—I think I shall carry the whole House with me—reprisals are rare, unofficial reprisals are now rare. Indeed, so rare are they that we may say they never occur in Ireland. If they did occur there would be questions on the Paper every day.
In addition to the Orders, I have myself on more than one occasion summoned all the senior police officers to Dublin 1188 and told each one in turn that I would hold him personally responsible for re-prisals in his particular police area. Splendidly have these gallant men—they are not all there now whom I addressed in this matter, because some of them have been murdered—gallantly have they held their men in check, in spite of murders so awful that no one in this House, to my mind, would face them with the same self-control and discipline, or, rather, I should say with greater self-control and discipline. Martial law was imposed subsequent to this Order because the martial law area was considered, and rightly considered, the most disturbed and rebellious area in Ireland. As soon as you impose martial law you hand over to the Commander-in-Chief absolute control of everybody in that particular area. He and his commanders dislike any form of reprisal as much as the most severe critic of the Government dislikes it, but they have laid down certain rules, military grounds I call them, within which they believe that in certain specified cases and under certain circumstances—there are not many such cases—the destruction of property is justifiable. These are the grounds: In every case where the official punishment is the destruction of a building, that building itself has been used in connection with rebel action, for instance, as the basis from which an ambush was prepared, or the owners have aided and abetted rebels in their campaign of outrage and murder. Those are the grounds drawn up by military men to be applied in these limited and clearly defined cases. It is true, and it must at times happen, that when the local military commander has the best reason for thinking that the occupants of any given house come within these rules, he may be mistaken. Innocent people may suffer and the houses of innocent people may be destroyed. I admit it at once. In a state of rebellion the greatest tragedy of all is that the innocent do suffer. I have told the House I shall try to meet these cases as far as I can. I will go further and say it is open to question whether reprisals generally in a martial law or other area are ever satisfactory in the long run. The right hon. and gallant Gentleman has had experience in South Africa, where that policy was tried. I have heard some people say it was successful and I have heard him say it was not. It is open to doubt, but as far as his Motion is con- 1189 cerned, what I have read shows that when reprisals are taken they are taken on necessary and purely military grounds, so that anyone who supports the right hon. and gallant Gentleman will support the policy of the Commander-in-Chief in the martial-law area, who only agrees to reprisals on military grounds.
§Mr. T. P. O’CONNOR Is that the explanation of the burning of Cork?
§Sir H. GREENWOOD No, it is not the explanation.
§Mr. MOSLEY I am very sorry to interrupt the right hon. Gentleman. [HON. MEMBERS: “Order, order!”]
§Mr. SPEAKER The right hon. Gentleman should be allowed to proceed with his speech.
§Mr. MOSLEY I want to challenge him on this point—
§Mr. SPEAKER The hon. Member has spoken already.
§Sir H. GREENWOOD Yes, the hon Member for Harrow (Mr. Mosley) has made a speech. He wished to commit a reprisal on me of the most violent kind by handing me down as standing at the bar of history. But I am now at the bar of the House of Commons, and that is sufficient for the day. I say it is open to question whether reprisals under the strictly limited rule laid down by the right hon. and gallant Gentleman who moved the Motion are successful or not. On that point let me say this: I am prepared to discuss the question with the Commander-in-Chief and to bring before him what has been said on the subject by undoubted supporters of the Government and of the soldiers and police in their endeavour to put down crime in Ireland, and to go into conference with him on this question. That being so, I am going further than the right hon. and gallant Gentleman. I hope he accepts that on the general principle of reprisals. Let me give the House an idea of what causes these reprisals. They are not done in an indiscriminate and promiscuous way. British generals, colonels, majors, and soldiers do not wander about Ireland like bandits let loose. They are under the strictest discipline. They suffer untold agonies owing to provocative and brutal murders, and a reprisal is only taken in the martial-law area, when no 1190 other remedy seems possible and when the commander of the area thinks it is necessary to meet the ends of justice.
§Lord H. CAVENDISH-BENTINCK Why not try Liberal principles for a change? [An HON. MEMBER: “What do you know about them? “]
§Sir H. GREENWOOD This is a most serious matter, and I wish the House to realise what leads up to the few reprisals, under carefully defined military conditions, in the martial-law area. I am going to read one letter, and one letter only, from a very gallant officer, murdered under the most distressing circumstances, and if this document does not touch the heart of everyone here, I am surprised. It is a letter that speaks for itself. It is, from a D.S.O. of the British Army, a man mentioned six times in despatches, murdered at the age of 52, leaving a wife and a little girl, aged three. It is from near Limerick, where he was in the custody of Sinn Feiners who kidnapped him: My own darling little wife,—I am to be shot in an hour’s time. Dearest, your hubby will die with your name on his lips, your face before his eyes, and he will die like an Englishman and a soldier. I cannot tell you, sweetheart, how much it is to me to leave you alone, nor how little to me personally to die. I have no fear, only the utmost, greatest, and tenderest love to you, and my sweet little Anne. I leave my cigarette case to the Regiment, my miniature medals to my father, whom I have implored to befriend you in everything, and my watch to the officer who is executing me, because I believe him to be a gentleman, to mark the fact that I bear him no malice for carrying out what he sincerely believes to be his duty. Good-bye, my darling, my own. Choose from among my things some object which you would particularly keep in memory of me. I believe that my spirit will be in it to love and comfort you. Tender, tender farewells and kisses.—Your own, Geof. That was Major Compton Smith, D.S.O., of the Royal Welsh Fusiliers, of Limerick. He is dead, done to death by Sinn Fein murderers. What would we do if we were in his regiment? This is the kind of case that leads to an official reprisal. I want to bring home to the House the difficulties that have to be faced. Here is a regiment on edge; it has seen his letter in the Press or it the regimental headquarters. The brigade commander must say to himself: “How can I show these men that we are trying to track down the assassins of their gallant commander?” In a case of this kind he takes certain houses which come 1191 within the category of reprisals that the Commander-in-Chief has laid down, namely, that they were used as a basis for which an ambush had been prepared or the owners of which had aided and abetted the rebels in their campaign of outrage and murder. In such a case, certain houses are taken. I want the House to understand that that is the kind of case that leads to a reprisal. Whether they are right or not is open to question. The point to remember is, do not judge the conduct of these soldiers in the martial law area from the cool, un-impassioned atmosphere of this House, but judge it by the conflict, the murder, and the mutilations that go on in certain parts of the martial law area. I come to the particular case raised by the right hon. Gentleman who opened this Debate, namely, that of Tincurry House, in Tipperary. He said himself that he supported a reprisal if there were reasonable grounds for thinking the occupants were consorting with the rebels.
§Major-General SEELY The words I used were, that the residents were participating in outrages and murder.
§Sir H. GREENWOOD I misunderstood what the right hon. Gentleman said. He read a letter from Dr. Tobin about the burning of the house. It of course made a great impression upon anyone, but you cannot deal with a case of burning, or any other action of that kind in Ireland as an isolated instance in a law-abiding community. Tipperary, where this burning took place, is one of the most disturbed areas in Ireland, and always has been. It is a common Irish saying that the Tipperary people are descended from Cromwell’s Ironsides, who were disbanded, and married Irish girls, and the descendants are the wild men.
§Lord H. CAVENDISH-BENTINCK They were peaceable enough before you came.
§Mr. SPEAKER The Noble Lord has had a full opportunity.
§Lord H. CAVENDISH-BENTINCK The right hon. Gentleman has no right — [HON. MEMBERS: “Order!”]
§Mr. SPEAKER Unless the Noble Lord listens as well as speaks he ought not to sit in this House.
§Sir H. GREENWOOD I was not saying anything to cause an interruption.
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§Lieut. – Commander KENWORTHY The usual tactless speech.
§Sir H. GREENWOOD I am sorry I have not the tact of the hon. and gallant Member. However, in Tipperary there have been 40 police and soldiers murdered in the last two years, and some six law-abiding citizens have been assassinated. It is a very mountainous part, and it lends itself, therefore, to the peculiar kind of guerilla warfare followed by the Irish Republican Army. That is Tipperary generally. When the right hon. Gentleman referred to the case of Tincurry House, I am bound to say he made, as he always does, a great impression upon me, and I dealt with it at once, through the Commander-in-Chief, who sent a special messenger to Tipperary from Dublin to inquire into the facts. The first letter was so remarkable that I asked for further facts, and I am compelled now to read the official reply I have received from the Commander-in-Chief in reference to Tincurry: I have discovered already that the house is marked ‘Divisional Headquarters, I.R.A.,’ on one of their own maps, and that they have an eye on the butts of the rifle ranges nearby. Tincurry House was destroyed on 14th May, together with several others as punishment for the murder of District Inspector Potter. It was very similar to that of Major Compton-Smith.
Sir T. POLSON May I say that officer was my first cousin?
§Sir H. GREENWOOD The letter goes on to say that they had a strong suspicion that Mrs. Tobin, who had strong Republican sympathies, was suspected of having harboured rebels. That is the official reply of the Commander-in-Chief. His opinion may be wrong. I do not think it is, but it may be. It only shows that in dealing with these Irish questions and disturbed areas like Tipperary, or any military-law area, it is extremely difficult to take the first statement of facts as absolutely correct. It may be that a great blunder has occurred here. It may be, and I promise the right hon. Gentleman that if there has been I will do my best to take into my most sympathetic consideration the question of compensating any innocent sufferer. I cannot do more. I will, however, put it to the House that there was a justifiable suspicion, from what I have read, on which the brigade commander—presum- 1193 ing the official reprisals were right—could fairly act. That is the view of the Commander-in-Chief. It was carried out. The destruction was regrettable, distressing, deplorable, I agree. But it was carried out under discipline. No one was insulted. I am bound to say that the scene described by the right hon. and gallant Gentleman of the hostess entertaining on the lawn the destroyers of her household was a thing that could only happen in Ireland.
§Major-General SEELY The destruction of the house where two lads laid down their lives for us during the War!
§Sir H. GREENWOOD That adds to the tragedy of it. But had the destruction anything to do with the sacrifice of gallant officers! I am giving the House the exact facts as they came to me. I think I have dealt with the various questions that have been raised in the Debate. My submission is that I can accept in substance the Resolution of the right hon. and gallant Gentleman, namely, that reprisals should not be carried out except on purely military grounds. I go further, and say that they are not carried out in any form except in the martial-law area, and in that area never carried out except on military grounds. I think I have shown that orders have been issued in reference to reprisals, and have been successful. Let us face realities. Hon. Gentlemen above the Gangway have criticised me very severely, and they are perfectly entitled to do so. One must do the best one can having regard to the political remedy of this House which is applied to Ireland in the face of rebellion in a considerable part of the country. We are faced with that re-bellion. The military have been criticised—I think very unfairly. The police of the Auxiliary Division come in very often for a very great deal of criticism—again, I think, unfairly. What are the facts? Within a few miles of this House there is a sinister and highly-paid rebellion going on, carried on with the object of separating for ever Ireland from the United Kingdom. That object is being carried out by the Irish Republican Army, as it is called. It consists of men who wear no uniform and no distinctive mark; they generally carry concealed weapons as civilians one minute, and they are murderers the next, 1194 contrary to all the laws of civilised warfare. The object of this Irish Republican Army—which is a negligible minority of the Irish people, who would be grateful to the Government if they could rid the country of this terror—is to intimidate this House and the British people into a surrender to Irish independence. I shall never consent to that. The Government will never consent to even argue it. The hope of Ireland, to my mind, is first of all to defeat this Irish Republican Army, and then encourage the coming together of the North and South, which has happily commenced, and leave Ireland to the Irish leaders themselves to settle within the limits defined by the Government. In that way only will you, bring peace to that distracted country and enable the vast majority of the people there to become happy and contented partners with us in the United Kingdom.
§Captain W. BENN I propose to confine myself quite narrowly to the terms of the Adjournment Motion without dealing with the wider issues which the Chief Secretary has opened. I should like to respond to the appeal made by earlier speakers to confine this Debate to a discussion of the policy of burning and reprisals and leave alone the wider issues, upon which I should only excite controversy in the minds of hon. Members. The question is, first, Is the burning of houses a policy which should be pursued by the Government, and is it likely to be successful? The Chief Secretary has told us that he accepts the sub-stance of the Motion which has been moved by the right hon. and gallant Member for Ilkeston (Major-General Seely). It lays down, that reprisals can only be justified on the ground of military necessity.
The Chief Secretary says that is, in effect, the policy which the Government are adopting in Ireland. That is the impression which he is giving us here in the House of Commons, but it is a totally different policy from the one he is pursuing in Ireland and it does not correspond in the least with the policy being carried out in Ireland under his administration. Take quite a recent case a few days ago. There was a Proclamation issued officially by the military in Cork. The Chief Secretary says that the policy of reprisals 1195 is merely the burning of houses as a military operation. This is the Proclamation in Cork: Owing to the burning of the houses of two loyalist farmers, three farm houses of active Sinn Feiners were burned as a military operation. That is not a military operation. [An HON. MEMBER: “Why not?”] Because these houses are not shown to be houses in which military offences were committed. They were not centres of attack. It is simply vengeance. Then the Proclamation goes on: It is intended to carry out further reprisals in that proportion, or if that proportion does not have the desired effect in a greater proportion. Hon. Gentleman cheer that. Exactly. It is to say that if they continue to burn two houses we will burn three, and if that does not stop them we will probably burn six. That is the Proclamation of the military in Cork. The Chief Secretary tells us that the burning of houses is merely to be carried on as a military operation in cases of military necessity. The two statements are in flat contradiction. The Chief Secretary says the reprisals are only carried out as a military necessity. What does he think of this Tralee Proclamation, which states that as a result of the murder of a sergeant certain houses, of which a list is given, were destroyed, and nine houses were bombed. Does this Proclamation square with what the Chief Secretary has told us to-night? The document gives a long list of houses and stores damaged, and it tells further how a woman and her child had a marvellous escape from a bomb which destroyed the piano and ceiling in a room in which they were. I do not desire to read touching instances. Heaven knows there are such instances on both sides. The Chief Secretary has read one of the most touching documents I ever heard in my life. That is the tragedy of it. The policy of the Chief Secretary produces heroes on both sides. [HON. MEMBERS: “No, no!”] The right hon. Gentleman is exciting feeling in this country by reading that letter, but other people in Ireland are exciting feelings of the people there and we are getting no nearer a solution of the problem. [An HON. MEMBER: “They should stop the murders!”] The right hon. Gentleman says that reprisals can only be justified by success. But 1196 he does not pretend that his policy is a success: he has just told us he is unable to carry it out with success because he has not troops enough to do it. The Chief Secretary has led the House to believe that a policy is being carried out in Ireland which, in fact, is not being carried out, and therefore I shall vote for my right hon. Friend’s motion.
§Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHY I want to ask the right hon. Gentleman a question with regard to the burning of the house and grocer’s shop of Mr. Honan, the Chairman of the Ennis Urban Council, as to which we have his own admission. It has been impossible [HON. MEMBERS: “Divide, divide!”]
§Mr. SPEAKER I am afraid the hon. and gallant Member’s habit of interruption makes it difficult for him to obtain a hearing. Might I appeal to hon. Members to allow him to deliver his speech. Perhaps that will teach him to extend the same forbearance to other hon. Members.
§Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHY I make no complaint, Sir. I am much obliged for your protection. This man Honan had been in hospital for three weeks—that is the right hon. Gentleman’s own admission. He was a widower, with six children, the eldest of whom was his daughter, aged 13. This man’s shop was blown to atoms as a reprisal by the military authorities, for an ambush and for the very dastardly assassination, which I condemn as heartily as the right hon. Gentleman or any of his supporters, of Sergeant Rew, of the Royal Scots Regiment. I deplore these murders; they make our task increasingly difficult. This man Honan had been in hospital for three weeks before that time, and was in hospital in bed at the time of the blowing up of his shop. His motherless children were in the house. They were bundled out, and the right hon. Gentleman gives, as an excuse, that Mr. Honan was one of the people known as the chief organisers of rebel activities. Yet he was in hospital for three weeks before the ambush. Is there any hon. Gentleman who can justify that? Can the right hon. Gentleman himself justify it? That is my first question.
My second question is in regard to the burnings of the farmhouse of Miss Fitzgerald. Her son served right through the 1197 War. It is in a lonely mountainous district. She protested to the Military Governor that she had no means of preventing an ambush some miles from her farmhouse, but the house of this lonely woman was burned down in revenge for the ambush. The third question is: what justification was there for the destruction of the house belonging to Madge O’Daly? She had gone to Dublin—that is admitted by the military authorities—to visit her doctor, and was far away from the premises when the ambush occurred. In spite of protests, her house was destroyed for military necessities. If that is the policy that the Government have adopted in Ireland, I consider they are damned before the civilised world. We have heard nothing worse than this in the trials of the German War criminals at Leipzig. If hon. Members are prepared to justify war on women and children and widows—[HON. MEMBERS: “Oh, oh!”]—and the destruction of their houses, if they are prepared to encourage the Government then let them vote for the Government. I only hope, however, that Members who were loud in condemning very similar occurrences in Belgium, committed by our enemies during the War, will attempt to make one protest to-night, when the opportunity occurs, against this inhuman and uncivilised action.
§Major-General SEELY I am placed in some difficulty in regard to one thing that has happened during this Debate. My right hon. Friend has said that he accepts the substance of my Motion, which has been almost unanimously supported in this House in the form in which I moved it. Then there is a point with which I was fully conversant before. The right hon. Gentleman’s Order has been quoted in an exactly contrary sense, namely, where two houses will not do, burn four, and where four will not do, burn six. I do not ask the right hon. Gentleman whether he disavows what has been done. No man in his position could do that. But I want to know whether what he has said amounts to a direct condemnation of an Order of that kind, which means indiscriminate reprisal in order to try to stop murder by burning houses. That is a perfectly clear question, and one to which we are entitled to an answer in order to guide us as to how we should vote.
1198
§Sir H. GREENWOOD I should be only too glad to guide my right hon. Friend as to how he should vote. Of course, I condemn indiscriminate burning. I do not believe that it brings to an end this campaign of assassination against the forces of the Crown and law-abiding citizens. I cannot deal across the Table with any particular case that has been raised in Debate, because I shall have to communicate with the military authorities on the spot to get their point of view. My right hon. Friend himself is an ex-Cabinet Minister, and knows that one can only speak with the knowledge supplied by those responsible for carrying out the orders of the Government. But I condemn, and have at this Box again and again condemned, any form of indiscriminate reprisal against houses or any other form of reprisal. The Motion states that reprisals in Ireland should be carried out only in the martial law area under an officer of not lower rank than a brigade commander, on military grounds, and within a certain limited period. That is why I said that I accepted the substance of that part of the Motion of my right hon. Friend.
§Major-General SEELY Could the right hon. Gentleman cancel any Order which appears to conflict with what he has said to-night?
§Sir H. GREENWOOD Of course I could.
§ Question, “That this House do now adjourn,” put, and negatived.
§ 11.0 P.M.
§Mr. T. P. O’CONNOR (seated and covered): On a point of Order. Did not the Chief Secretary declare that he was ready to accept the Motion? Why therefore does he now demand a Division?
§Mr. SPEAKER There is not a Division.
§The remaining Orders were read, and postponed.
c1198
ADJOURNMENT. 17 words
Back to HOUSE OF COMMONS.
Forward to ADJOURNMENT.

Weapons Of The IRA 3.rd West Cork Brigade

A contributor has recently sent us some photos of weapons used by the Irish Republican Army , third West Cork Brigade, we thank you very much.  The pistol is a Webley and Scott Ltd London & Birmingham, 6.3 mm automatic pistol.

The machine gun is a Lewis ,marked Animes Automatiques Lewis Belgium and Bimingham co Ltd proof marks.

Many weapons used by the IRA  in west Cork were captured from Crown forces and it can be well assumed that these weapons were captured at some of the famous ambushes in that area. I have no further details so please dont ask as these were sent in by sender unknown.

IRA weapons:

Lee Enfields , mausers , webleys, lewis and vickers were all used, along with a multitude of shot guns , mills bombs(grenades) , and numerous different types of pistols/revolvers. Some British Writers would have you believe they used hatchets too, no comment.

We believe they are a great addition to the site and would only ask that more reader would send in photos , documents or any other information.

IRA Pistol

third West Cork Brigade Pistol

IRA pistol Webley & Scot

IRA Lewis Machine Gun

Irish republican Army MG

Irish republican Army MG

close up Irish republican Army MG LEWIS

close up Irish republican Army MG LEWIS

close up Irish republican Army MG LEWIS

mechanism close up Irish republican Army MG LEWIS

mechanism close up Irish republican Army MG LEWIS

IRA LEWIS GUN 2

IRA LEWIS GUN

IRA LEWIS GUN

We hope you enjoy the great photos and please send us your own photos, documents or other information to  info@theirishwar.com

or go to the web site http://theirishwar.com/

Michael Collins Painting

We have been contacted by Tadgh Creed form West Cork and has has sent us a lovely painting he completed on Michael Collins,. It is a fine painting. Well done tadgh and maybe you will do more?

Thanks Tadgh!.

If any reader has more paintings or drawings or indeed photos please e mail them to us , we would be glad to publish them. E mail us at  info@theirishwar.com

or visit our web site at  http://theirishwar.com/

Tomás Mac Curtain Lord Mayor of Cork

Tomás Mac Curtain (20 March 1884 – 20 March 1920) was a Sinn Fein Lord Mayor of cork city,Ireland.. He was elected in January 1920.

He was born at Ballyknockane in the Parish of Mourne abbey in March 1884. He attended Burnfort National School. In 1897 the family moved to Blackpool on the northside of Cork city (corcaigh) where he attended The North Monastery school.. Mac Curtain became active in numerous cultural and political movements from the turn of the nineteenth century when he joined the Blackpool, Cork branch of Conradh na Gaeilge(the Gaelic League), becoming its secretary in 1902. He had diverse interests in music, poetry, history, archaeology and Irish history. He worked in his early career as a clerk and in his free time taught Irish to those who wished to learn. In 1911 he joined the Fianna Eireann  and was a founding member of the Irish Volunteers .

IRISH VOLUNTEERS AT SHEARES STREET CORK CITY

BACK: P. Cotter, Sean Nolan, Dathi Cotter, Sean Scanlan, Fred Murray. CENTER: Tom O’Sullivan & Diarmuid O’Shea (with rifles), Tom Barry, Pat Corkery, Donal Barrett, Donal Og O’Callaghan, Tadg Barry, Diarmud Lynch, Con Twomey (with rifle) FRONT: Sean Murphy, Tomas MacCurtain, Sean McDermot, Herbert Moore Pim, Sean O’Sullivan, Sean O’Murthille.

He met Eilish Walsh (Eibhlís Breathnach) at a Gaelic League meeting and they married in 1908. They had six children, five of whom survived into adulthood. The family lived over number 40 Thomas Davis Street where Tomás had a small clothing and rainwear factory.

In April 1916 at the outset of the Easter Rising Mac Curtain commanded a force of up to 1,000 men of the Irish Volunteers who assembled at various locationsaround County Cork. From the volunteers headquarters at Sheare’s Street in the city, Mac Curtain and his officers awaited orders from the volunteer leadership in Dublin but conflicting instructions and confusion prevailed and as a result the Cork volunteers never entered the fray. A tense stand-off developed when British forces surrounded the volunteer hall and continued for a week until a negotiated agreement led to the surrender of the volunteers’ arms to the then Lord Mayor of Cork Thomas Butterfield on the understanding that they would be returned at a later date. This did not happen however and Mac Curtain was jailed in the former Frongoch Prisoner of War camp in Wales. After the general amnesty of participants in the Rising 18 months later Mac Curtain returned to active duty as a Commandant of what was now the Irish republican Army .

He was elected in the January 1920 council elections as the Sinn Féin councillor for NW Ward No. 3 of Cork, and was chosen by his fellow councillors to be the Lord Mayor. He began a process of political reform within the city, making changes to the way in which the council operated and was run.

Death

In January 1919 the Anglo-Irish war started and Mac Curtain became an officer in the IRA . On 20 March 1920, his 36th birthday, Mac Curtain was shot dead in front of his wife and son by a group of men with blackened faces, who were found to be members of the Royal Irish constabulary (RIC) by the official inquest into the event. In the wake of the killing which was in revenge for the shooting of a policeman, Mac Curtain’s house in the city’s Blackpool area, was ransacked.

THE LOCATION WHERE Tomás Mac Curtain WAS ASSASSINATED, THERE IS A PLAQUE TO COMMEMORATE  Tomás Mac Curtain ON THE UPPER STORY.

The killing caused widespread public outrage. The coroner’s inquest passed a verdict of wilful murder against British Prime Minister Lloyd George and against certain members of the RIC. The IRA later killed the man who ordered the attack, District Inspector Oswald Swanzy, in Lisburn, County Antrim ,on 22 August 1920 using Mac Curtain’s personal handgun, sparking a pogrom of Catholics in the town. Mac Curtain is buried in St. Finbarrs Cemetery, Cork.

His successor to the position of Lord Mayor, Terence MacSwiney, died while on hunger strike  in Brixton prison, London.

Tomás Óg Mac Curtain

Mac Curtain’s son, Tomás Óg (junior) (1915–1994) later became a leading republican and member of the IRA Executive (whose main purpose was to elect the Chief of staff of the IRA . In January 1940, he was sentenced to death by the De Valera government for mortally wounding Garda John Roche at the end of St. Patrick Street Cork  city centre on 3 January 1940. Detective Garda Roche, from Union Quay Barracks, had shadowed him for weeks and following a confrontation, he was shot. However Tomas was granted clemency due to the fact that his father had been killed by the British Army. He was released after seven years. He later served on the IRA executive during the Border Campaign.

I.R.A. Rineen Ambush 22 September 1920

MANY THANKS TO PADRAIG O ‘ RUAIRC FOR CONTRIBUTING THE RINEEN AMBUSH ARTICLE.

PADRAIG IS A WELL KNOWN AUTHOR ON THE IRISH WAR OF INDEPENDENCE PERIOD AND WE RECOMMEND  HIS TWO BOOKS,  “BLOOD ON THE BANNER”  AND  ” THE  BATTLE FOR LIMERICK CITY”.

In the early autumn of 1920 Anthony Malone and the other officers of the 4th Battalion had been ordered by the Brigade council of the Mid Clare Brigade I.R.A. to prepare an ambush for British motor patrols in the Milltown Malbay and Ennistymon areas. I.R.A. intelligence reported that a patrol of regular R.I.C. men and Black and Tans travelled in a Crossly Tender lorry from Ennistymon to Milltown Malbay at half past ten each Wednesday morning.   The Brigade Council decided to attack the R.I.C. and Black and Tans the next Wednesday the 22nd of September.

The countryside along the R.I.C.‘s weekly route was examined an ambush site was selected at Rineen about two miles from Milltown Malbay on the Ennistymon road. The site was a low cliff where the West Clare Railway rose sharply above the road commanding a good view of Lahinch and the surrounding coastline to the West. A curve in the road would force vehicles travelling from Ennistymon to Milltown to slowdown as they reached the ambush site.

The ambush at Rineen was to be the first major attack on the British forces in the area and the officers of the Mid Clare Brigade decided to use a large force of I.R.A. Volunteers from eight companies in the 4th Battalion area to take part in the attack.  The morning of the attack each of these I.R.A. companies were to supply seven Volunteers to form the attacking party or to act as scouts and messengers. On the 21st of September John Joe Neylon was detailed to select seven men from the Ennistymon Company of the I.R.A. to take part in the ambush: “On the night previous to the attack, I paraded the Ennistymon Company and called for Volunteers to take part in it without disclosing any details of what was about to come off. Nearly every man present and there was a parade of about seventy strong the same night – volunteered. I had to select only seven and that was a difficult job indeed. When I had made my selection I instructed these men to report to Lehanes at Lahinch that night and went off myself on a bike to see Ignatious O Neill with whom I had some other business to discuss.”

Ignatius O Neill  was still recovering from the wounds he had received at the Crowe’s Bridge ambush and was staying at safe house at Lisdoonvarna. The officers of the Mid Clare Brigade had decided  not to include O Neill in the attack because he was still recovering from his wounds and had kept all information regarding the planned attack at Rineen from him. When John Joe Neylon met him that night, O Neill had heard of the preparations for the attack and was furious: “O Neill met me with a violent reception. He was raging mad because he had heard from some source that we had decided to bring off the ambush without asking him taking part. He described the battalion officers as ‘a shower of bastards’, and accused me of being a ‘double crosser’. In order to placate him I said ‘All right the ambush is coming off and you’ll have to take charge.’ Although he did not want to be in charge I Insisted that he should and outlined to him what our plans were and told him of the arrangements which had been made. As far as I remember he made no change in them. We arrived in Lahinch about three or four o clock in the morning. And there found between sixty and sixty five men assembled. All the companies had supplied the seven men they were asked to do and, in addition, there were the officers of the battalion staff.”

At four o clock in the morning O Neill and Neylon led the I.R.A. Volunteers towards Carrig at Ballyvaskin where the Moy company of the I.R.A. scouted the route to Rineen while the members of the attacking party followed on foot. Thomas Mc Donough drove a number of  I.R.A. Volunteers from Ennistymon to meet the main I.R.A. force at the final assembly point about a mile from the ambush site at Rinneen.  By six that morning fifty members of the I.R.A. had assembled for the ambush. O Neill posted sentries guarding the roads to Milltown Malbay and Lahinch while the main force of the I.R.A. settled down for a brief rest along the boreen leading from the railway line down to the roadway. O Neill and Neylon reviewed the ground with the different company captains and discussed the advantages and possible problems posed by their chosen position. Both the R.I.C. and British Army had a habit of suddenly changing the formation and strength of their transport patrols, if the strength of the R.I.C.‘s patrol was increased to more than one lorry, the attacking formation would have to be changed quickly. A number of signallers were posted along the hilltops near Rinneen and Thomas Moroney was placed in charge of the scouts posted on the roads leading to the ambush site; whose job was to watch for the approach of the R.I.C. patrol and to give advanced warning of a change its strength or the arrival of British re-enforcements. As daylight approached O Neill assembled the remaining forty I.R.A. Volunteers and with the help of John Joe Neylon and Patrick Lehane divided them into three different attacking parties. O Neill repeatedly explained to them in detail the plan of the operation until he was satisfied that each individual I.R.A. volunteer and section leader knew what their task was.

To the north and west of the I.R.A.’s position at Rineen, open ground and fields swept towards the sea. To the south and east of the railway line small fields gave way to open bog land leading towards Milltown Malbay. Ignatius O Neill made an inspection of the I.R.A.’s arms and rejected a number of old shotguns.  The remaining arms included the six Lee Enfield rifles, three Carbine rifles, a large number of shotguns a few revolvers.   Anthony Malone and Patrick Kerins were given rifles ordered to take up  position in the behind a low fence twenty yards directly to the north of the road,  two other riflemen Stephen Gallagher and Sean Bourke were stationed about two hundred yards further west towards Milltown Malbay. These four had orders to prevent the R.I.C. and Black and Tans leaving from the lorry and taking cover in the fields, or from attempting to retreat towards the sea and back to Lahinch.

O Neill gave the remaining rifles to John Joe Neylon, David Kennelly, Dan Lehane and Michael O Dwyer. Peter Vaughan an experienced ex-American soldier who had served on the Western front during the First World War was equipped with two hand grenades. These five men were to form the main attacking force and were stationed at the north western end of a small by-road which connected to the Lahinch road. The main body of I.R.A. volunteers were stationed about fifty yards further up this by-road  where it crossed the railway line. This group commanded a good view of the ambush site being were in a raised position about forty feet above the level of the road at a distance of thirty yards. They were mostly armed with shotguns and were to act as a secondary attacking force with orders to cover the position of O Neill’s group. A number of large furze bushes had been cut to provide camouflage for the these men. At O Neill’s command, a single rifle shot from John Joe Neylon was to be the signal to open the attack.  The riflemen in the first attacking group had orders to shoot the driver of the lorry to prevent it breaking out of the ambush position. Peter Vaughan was to throw his two grenades into the back of the R.I.C. lorry. If the I.R.A. came into difficulties they were to fall back to the railway line crossing the hill at Rineen  and use it as a secondary line of defence while they retreated. It was now past seven o clock and the republicans settled down to a long wait before the expected arrival of the R.I.C. patrol.

That morning eleven miles from Rineen, the 2nd Battallion of the I.R.A.’s West Clare Brigade were also waiting in ambush. Captain Alan Lendrum an ex-British Army officer from Tyrone had been appointed Acting Resident Magistrate at Kilkee by the British authorities. Captain Lendrum occasionally travelled to and from court in an R.I.C. Crossly Tender with a number of Black and Tans for security, but more often he travelled alone in his ford car. The 4th battalion of the West Clare Brigade watched his movements for several weeks, and decided to hold up Lendrum at gunpoint and commandeer his car.  On the morning the 22nd of September while the I.R.A. lay in ambush at Rineen another group of I.R.A. Volunteers waited for Captain Lendrum at a level railway crossing at Caherfeenick two miles north of Doonbeg. As Lendrum drove towards the level crossing the gates were closed by  two I.R.A. Volunteers and he was ordered at gunpoint to surrender his car.  Captain Lendrum drew his automatic pistol but was shot dead before he had a chance to fire.  This action was to have serious consequences for the I.R.A. ambushers at Rineen later that morning.

Thomas Mc Donough had just arrived back at Ennistymon after driving some I.R.A. Volunteers from the town to the ambush site at Rineen, and reported for work at Roughan’s Garage when he saw the patrol of R.I.C. and Black and Tans preparing to travel to Milltown Malbay: “I was standing at the garage door and watched a lorry of police move off from the barracks across the road. It was driven by a Black and Tan named Hardiman  and manned by I think six R.I.C. men including Seargent Hynes and constables Kelly, Harte and Hodnett all of whom I knew well.” As the Crossly tender roared out of Ennistymon towards Milltown Malbay a young I.R.A. Volunteer watched the R.I.C. and Black and Tans disappear in a cloud of dust from his work at Roughans shop and was overheard saying to himself, ‘They are going now but, will they ever come back?’

After eleven o clock the I.R.A. ambushers hidden at Rineen heard the sound of  a train coming from the south and hid from view behind ditches until the train had passed. As the I.R.A. Volunteers scrambled back into position, the scouts watching the road from Lahinch signalled the approach of the R.I.C. John Joe Neylon could hear the sounds of the R.I.C patrol approaching when the I.R.A.’s scouts reached him and O Neill  with reports that the enemy force was much larger than expected: “About noon, word was received from the scouts that the three lorries were coming from the Ennistymon side. O Neill had a quick consultation with myself and a few of the officers beside him. He had expected only one lorry and the plans had been made accordingly. His force was mainly composed of raw material and the ground did not lend itself to quick deployment. In the circumstances he decided, in view of the scouts message, to withhold fire. When only one lorry passed he realised a mistake had been made by one of the scouts.”  The message ‘Police lorry coming.’ had been misinterpreted by one of the I.R.A.’s scouts as ‘Three lorries coming.’ The result was that the R.I.C.’s Crossly Tender was allowed to pass through the ambush without a shot being fired.

Realising the mistake, O Neill dispatched Jack Clune, an I.R.A. Volunteer from Inagh, to cycle to Milltown Malbay and report on the activities of the R.I.C. patrol and to report back immediately if it appeared that the R.I.C. and Black and Tans had seen the I.R.A. Volunteers waiting in ambush and were calling for re-enforcements. O Neill moved the riflemen in the first attacking party into a more suitable position to attack the Crossley tender on its return from Milltown Malbay and made a few other changes to the I.R.A.’s other positions while he waited for Clune to return with news about the R.I.C. patrol. Clune returned from Milltown Malbay two hours later and reported that the R.I.C. patrol had not detected the ambush and their lorry was parked outside the R.I.C. barracks in the town facing the direction of Rineen. Clune’s information was confirmed when of the republican scouts signalled the return of the police lorry and the I.R.A heard the sound of the R.I.C. crossly tender approaching. A few minutes later the Crossley Tender re-appeared. It passed about ten yards beyond the laneway to O Gorman’s house on the northern side of the road when O Neill gave the order to Neylon to fire the opening shot. Peter Vaughan stood up and threw his first grenade at the police lorry, his second grenade missed and landed on the northern edge of the roadway  exploding harmlessly. Already the I.R.A. Volunteers in the first and second attacking parties had opened fire blasting the R.I.C. and Black and Tans in the back of the vehicle with rifle and shotgun fire.

Within seconds of John Joe Neylon firing the opening shot the attack had ended: “immediately all the party opened up. The attack was over in a matter of seconds. There was no reply from the lorry and our fellows rushed towards it to find five dead police men lying inside. One of the police managed to get off the lorry and had gone about three hundred yards towards Milltown when he was seen and shot by Donal Lehane of Lahinch in a field near O Connors house” A short distance away on the northern side of the road Anthony Malone had joined the first attacking section in taking aim at the driver: “The pre arranged signal shot was fired. There was an immediate volley from the different positions. I fired three or four  rounds at the men sitting in the cab and next I saw the driver slump over the wheel as blood pumped from a wound in his neck. He seemed to be staring directly at Kerins and myself. The men on the other side of the road poured several rounds into the tender and, in a matter of minutes the attack was over.”  As soon as the firing stopped O Neill gave the order to cease fire and search the vehicles. The I.R.A. searched the Crossly Tender and recovered a six Lee Enfield and  Carbine rifles, six .45 Webbly and Scott revolvers, a number of Mill’s bomb hand grenades and almost three thousand rounds of .303 ammunition. After the weapons and ammunition were recovered the lorry was set on fire. Patrick Kerin rushed onto the roadside with Anthony Malone and began to search the bodies of the dead R.I.C. men and Black and Tans for intelligence papers and official documents: “When the firing stopped Malone and myself rushed over to the tender. I searched one of the dead men and, from correspondence which he had received from lady admirers in London, I learned that his name was Reggie Hardman, obviously a Black and Tan.” Reginald Hardman was the first Black and Tan killed in Clare, he was twenty one years old and came from East Finchley in London. He had served in the Royal Artillery Regiment before joining the R.I.C. The other five members of the patrol were all regular R.I.C. men; Constable Michael Harte from Sligo, Constable John Hodnett from Cork, Constable Michael Kelly from Roscommon and Constable John Mc Guire from Mayo. Sergeant Michael Hynes from Roscommon was fatally wounded in the ambush and died two days later.

While the Crossly Tender and the bodies of the dead R.I. C. men were being searched,  I.R.A. Volunteers sat on the roadside smoking and talking until Dan Kennelly, who had served in both the British Army and R.I.C., urged the men to get back up the hillside to safety quickly. The I.R.A. shared out quantities of the captured .303 ammunition and began moving back up towards the railway line crossing the hill. Seamus Hennessy heard the sound of lorries approaching from Lahinch and shouted to Stephen Gallagher, who had gone to collect the rifle and ammunition from the dead R.I.C. man who had tried to escape from the ambush, to hurry back towards the hill. Next Hennessey shouted a warning to a group of I.R.A. Volunteers who had halted below the first hill and indicated in the direction of the noise. A few minutes later a British Army lorry came around the bend in the road below the railway. The driver stopped when he saw the blazing R.I.C. Crossly Tender and the soldiers jumped out and rushed up the hillside towards the railway line. Moments later a second British lorry halted a short distance behind the first and more British soldiers poured out to pursue the I.R.A.

Ten lorries of British soldiers had left Ennistymon to search for Captain Lendrum who had been killed by the West Clare Brigade of the I.R.A. at Caherfeenick near Doonbeg earlier that morning. Captain Lendrum’s wife regularly phoned the military and R.I.C whenever he was due to make a journey and when he failed to arrive at Ennistymon the British military had set out to look for him. As they approached Rineen they heard the distant gunfire from the ambush and saw the smoke rising from the burning crossly tender and members of the I.R.A. crossing the hillside. When the British soldiers appeared in view advancing toward the I.R.A. the republican scouts let out a warning cry of ‘Military!’ and O Neill gave the orders to retreat across the railway line back towards Ballyvaskin. A small group, including Ned Lynch, Michael O Keefe and the Bourke brothers, who had been separated from the main force of the I.R.A. and made off towards the sea shore in the opposite direction without being noticed by the British soldiers.

As the British soldiers closed ground on the main force of the I.R.A. scrambling over the hilltop O Neill and John Joe Neylon stood their ground along the railway line to cover the others escape: “Those who  had already been making their way towards the top of the hill, as well as the party who were starting to do so all came under heavy fire, rifle and machine gun from the newly arrived troops. … As the big majority of our men had only shotguns, they were of no use in meeting the British forces who, in a short time had reached the hilltop a quarter of a mile or so east of the scene of the ambush. There was only one course open to us and that was to use the riflemen to fight a rearguard action while the others with the shotguns were making their way to cover and safety on the Ballyvaskin side. Unfortunately only a few of the riflemen were available for this purpose. They included O Neill himself, Michael Dwyer, Patrick Lehane and myself. The other men with rifles had gone off in different ways and it was not possible to collect them. The four of us took up positions in a field adjacent to Honan’s house and engaged the military who were using a machine gun behind a stone wall at the corner of a field about three hundred yards almost due east.” Their opening volley felled the leading British soldier advancing towards them, and his comrades took cover in the heather. The four riflemen spread out and commenced rapid fire returning the captured British .303 ammunition to its previous owners at a generous rate. This gave the British soldiers the impression that they were facing a much larger group of riflemen. Seamus Hennesy was headed towards a gap in a bank when Patrick Vaughan shouted a warning to them ‘Don’t go out that gap, for they’re like to set the gun on it. Roll over the bank when I shout.’ When Vaughan gave the word the shotgun men tumbled over the bank while the British soldiers on the hill raked the gap of the bank and its edges with machine gun fire.

While O Neill and Neylon’s group began firing on the British soldiers in an effort to halt their advance Patrick Kerin and the other I.R.A. Volunteers continued their retreat towards Ballyvaskin across open  ground: “We went in extended formation and had gone a hundred yards or so when we came under heavy machine gun fire from the north-east. The military had reached the top of Dromin hill and placed a machine gun in position four hundred yards away from us. Our party at this stage were in the middle of a ten acre field through which ran a stream in the direction of Ballyvaskin. Pat Frawley and myself made for the stream. On the way I was stunned by a bullet which passed between my ear and head.  Recovering after a few seconds, I got into a shallow drain where I remained for ten minutes or so, and then dashed twenty or thirty yards further on to a cock of hay. There I found Pat Mc Gough, O/C of the Inagh Company. With him I got as far as a low stone wall. The firing was still fierce and was coming mostly from a machine gunner. Here we began to time the machine gun burst and reckoned that a pan was being changed. We dashed across another fifty or sixty yards of open ground behind another stone fence where we met two more of our crowd, Dave Kenelly and John Crawford. Kenelly who had a rifle was in an exhausted state and enquired if any of us were in a condition to return the fire. Crawford had a carbine which he captured from the tender, but the ‘cut off’ had jammed. This I put right by forcing it with my teeth, and we both opened fire. I exhausted all the ammunition I had, a total of fifty two rounds. Our fire enabled the men in our vicinity to retreat in more safety and, when my ammunition was finished, we went after them.”

On the side of Dromin Hill, John Joe Neylon’s group were coming under increasing pressure as the rest of the I.R.A. Volunteers reached Ballyvaskin. They had concentrated their rifle fire on the machine gun grew and thought they had wounded one of them because the fire halted for a short period but longer than a normal stoppage. When the machine gun resumed firing a second volley  from the four riflemen silenced it again, Neylon and his comrades used this opportunity to retreat. As they scrambled town the hillside the British soldiers fire was so close to them that Neylon had his leg grazed by a bullet which passed through the leg of his trousers: “O Neill was wounded in the thigh early at this stage of the fighting and as we retreated he had to be removed. This was done by Michael Dwyer who carried him on his back. Gradually we made our way towards Ballyvaskin taking advantage of whatever bit of cover was available … ultimately the whole party got into the Ballyvaskin country and dispersed”
With the British soldiers in hot pursuit the republicans had no time for an ordered retreat and broke up into a number of smaller groups which would be harder for the British forces to pursue. Local farm labourers who had been making trams of hay near the edge of the bog when the running battle started helped carry the two wounded I.R.A. Volunteers to safety and sent for doctors to Milltown and Lahinch. The wounded were then placed on stretchers and carried across country to Moy. Patrick Kerin and Michael Curtain expected British forces to arrive in the area at any time and hid their rifles and the papers they had taken from the R.I.C. men’s bodies in a stone wall near Molohan’s house. It was now after four o clock and the British military had sent for reinforcements as soon as they had arrived at the ambush site at Rineen two hours earlier. O Neill and Curtin were the only I.R.A. members were wounded in the withdrawal though neither was wounded seriously. However the British forces suffered much heavier losses, in addition to the six dead members of the R.I.C. a  number of British soldiers had been wounded including a Royal Army Service Corps driver.

General Tudor

Many thanks to Gerard Burrows for the following article and pics,,its a very interesting collection of photos  and information relating to General Tudor.

I read with interest your references to Tudors Toughs ie the Tan, Auxies etc. As you know Tudor was the only man ever to hold the title Chief of Police in Irish Police history. I own the complete uniform of Major Gen Tudor which can be seen on some photos of the period and also archived News reels of him and Gen French inspecting Auxies in Dublin. My Grandfather was head constable in the RIC (22 yrs) and was based in Killorglin at the time of the Castlemaine Ambush which Dan Keating took part in. My mother relatedthe story of this ambush many a time when I was young, she told us that her father was told by the mother of one of the ambushers that this ambush was to take place. My grandfather had pleaded with the DI not to send the men to Tralee to collect their wages that day but he was over ruled by the DI with the result that 8 were killed my mother said there was as many as 11 killed as she was in the station when the bodies were brought back,she also said that my grandfather had to draw his gun to prevent other police going on reprisals. Later my grandfather was sent to West Cork until the truce in 1922. He survived one other ambush at Dunmanway,thanks to his house keeper telling him her son was leading a band of men to kill him. After the Truce he went to England with his family under an assumed name but later returned to live in Belfast on the Falls Road where his youngest son joined the IRA under old Wish Fox. Later my grandfather exiled him to England and he didnt return home until his father died. My grandfather was from Tralee,a catholic and an Irish speaker, just thought you might be interested in this wee story.
Slan go Foil
Gerry

Hi Garry no problem at all publishing the story of my grand father Micheal Blake and I will send you photos of my Gen Tudor collection which includes items of his full dress uniform from the Boer War period, also I have his uniforms from his command in Palestine and I found correspondance from Churchill regarding members of the Police Force in Ireland to be offered posts in Palestine. I have a copy of a letter from Gen Tudor to Churchill in which he refers to the Black and Tans doing a great job there. I have spent about 4 yrs now researching documents and writing to various people in Newfoundland who knew General Tudor including a doctor who was with him when he died. One lady in particular whose father was a friend of Tudor when she was a young girl , this lady by the way is English speaks Irish and is a reknowned Harp player and is in her 80,s !!! she send me a photo of a privately produced book by Gen Tudor entitled “The Fog of War” signed “To Carla with love Hugh” also she sent me a picture of his brass knuckle duster!!!! this item he always carried while meeting the boats coming in with their catches as most of the crews were Irish. A friend of mine has Gen Tudors palm pistol which he keeps promising to let me have!!! nothing as yet, it is residing in Florida at the minute. Tudor is difficult to write about as according to Carla Emerson he was declared Persona Non Grata by the establishment in Britain, she speaks of the Scotsman been involved, Ramsey Mc Donald??although his foreign secretary who led the Labour Party commission to Ireland at the time may have caused his departure, I have checked letters and diaries of these people and found that the Diary of the Foreign secretery  had all its pages removed from 1920-25, rather interesting??Anyway to finish my book on Gen Tudor I need to know who sent him to Newfoundland and why there?? as it has a big Irish community, infact Gen Tudors House Keeper/nurse was Irish Monica Mc Carthy whose family were from Cork. So from Britains best General to fish salesman and according to Micheal Collins himself during a conversation with Captain William Darling who was one of Tudors Officers in Dublin Castle after Collins had a car accident and was offered a lift to Dublin by Darling who was unaware of who he was helping out until Collins personally introduced himself enroute to Dublin where the pair ended up drinking in the Vaughan Hotel, Collins referred to Tudor as one of Britains best Generals sent to fight him and his men, he also mentioned that the IRA always knew when they encountered Auxies as they tended to put out a good fight!!! his words. This man Darling is the great uncle of Alister Darling the ex British Labour minister. During my searches through British records I found on marked “secret” along with many others!!! but this was one was very interesting as it mentioned a Royal Navy ship was on its way to Ireland with a supply of Gas Grenades for  the “Free State Army” for use against the anti treaty forces, apparently they suddenly discovered that they had signed a treaty prohibiting the use of gas and they were to be disposed of in Dublin Bay!!!! wonderful what you find when you are researching things. Anyway I will send you some pics of the collection and sorry about the spelling I always get timed out when I go to check it.!!!!

Slan go Foil
Gerry                                                                     GENERAL TUDORS UNIFORM

GERRY WITH THE UNIFORM

1916 Rising, 1916-1966 Rising Survivors Medal

Here we have a nice example of the Irish 1916 Rising Survivors medal, nicely stamped. This is from Jerry McCarthy’s collection. Thanks for the pics, Jerry.

1916 Rising survivors medal obverse
1916 Rising survivors medal detail 1916 Rising survivors medal detail

Irish Volunteers Cap Cork connection

A friend and collector has supplied us with photographs of a Cork Volunteers cap,very nice quality and condition. Many thanks to Daniel Hulin.


IRA Dromkeen ambush 1921

The Dromkeen Ambush took place on 3 February 1921, during the Irish War of Independence at Dromkeen in County Limerick. The Irish Republican Army ambushed a Royal Irish Constabulary patrol, killing 11 policemen.

The ambush was carried out by the flying columns of the East and Mid Limerick Brigades IRA, some 45 riflemen, under the command of Donnocha O’Hannigan commander of East Limerick Brigade Flying Column. Some time earlier the police had discovered the arms dump of the Mid-Limerick Brigade. Only one IRA man—Liam Hayes—was wounded.

Only two of the police got away. Nine were killed in action and another two were executed after being taken prisoner. Three of the dead RIC men were Irish and the remainder were British Black and Tans. In reprisal, British forces burned ten homes and farms in the area.

In February 2009, up to 2,000 people turned up for the unveiling of a memorial to the ambush.

Have a look at the following videos, they are quite interesting.

Dromkeen ambush videos

Part 1
Part 2
Part 3
Part 4
Part 5

Irish Volunteer Uniforms

An article posted by Irish author and historian Padraig O Ruairc. Thanks Padraig.

Re-enactors have been asking me for some time about Irish Volunteers / I.R.A. uniforms and what is and is not accurate. This is a very big issue to cover as the uniform, appearance, personnel, weaponry targets and tactics of the Irish Volunteers / I.R.A. changed hugely between 1913 and 1923. (Basically we should look at the period as three different conflicts 1916 – The War of Independence – Civil War) Few republicans in the period ever owned a formal republican uniform ie, hat tunic belt etc. Usually they wore civilian clothing with a lapel button or badge, a uniform hat and a uniform belt with military equipment. Coupled with this is the fact that rebel armies rarely if ever manage to get any sense of uniformity in their uniforms. However uniforms were important in the period for propaganda reasons to those who saw themselves as being the legitimate army of Ireland – having a uniform gave them an extra sense of legitimacy. Most estimates place the number of uniformed republicans who took part in the 1916 rising as between 1/4 to 1/3 or the whole rebel forces.

I must stress that for the purposes of re-enacting the period it is far more important to have a good set of civilian clothes for the 1913 -1923 period and a licensed blank firing period weapon i.e. Lee Enfield or Ross Rifle re bored to 8-10 shotgun. 10 men with perfect nice green Irish Volunteers uniforms will be accurate for battle in 1916 – however no unit of the I.R.A. was that well uniformed in the War Of Independence – by then most republicans were far more comcerned with getting guns and ammunition not uniforms. So anyone re-enacting the period should start by getting the kit which is shown in Picture 1.

Irish Volunteers

Picture 1

This is by far the cheapest way to put an impression together as chords, tweed jackets, waistcoats and so on can be bought for practicly nothing in any charity shop. And if dosent take your fancy then every one has an old suit at home for weddings etc once its a dark colour, black, brown, grey, navy or pinstripe. However for those of you who are insistant about the Irish Volunteer uniform here it goes.

This is just the first article I intend to descride the uniform in a series of articles as follows.

1 The Official Irish Volunteer Uniform (Ordinary Ranks) 1914 – 1916
2 Officers Uniforms 1914 – 1916
3 War of Independence – I.R.A. Volunteers Uniforms
4 Badges, belt buckles and regional variations in uniform
5 Weapons and Equipment

Or something like the above any way. I will not be attempting to give the history of the organiseation in any detail.

1 – The official Irish Volunteer Uniform (Ordinary Ranks) 1914 -1916

“The Volunteer Uniform. Report By Uniform Sub-Committee, 12th August 1914.
Report;-Summary of work done.

Uniform Cloth; Having made exhaustive enquiries the sub-committee found that it was necessary to start ab initio. They found that no suitable uniform cloth was made in Ireland. They therefore obtained samples of a high class uniform serge from a well known English mill. From these they selected a grey green cloth of a very suitable colour for field work in Ireland. They then inquired from several Irish mills wether they could match this sample. The buisness was not keenly sought after as the mills were full of orders and the extent of the Volunteers requirements was somewhat uncertain. Finally Messers Morrough Bros. of Douglas Mills, Cork got special looms working and matched the sample. The sample they produced was submitted to experts and pronounced excellent. It was therefor decided to give the first order to the Morrough Brothers.

Design of Uniform

After having several samples submitted the sub committee decided upon the cut of the uniform. This was fixed as standard for all Irish Volunteers. The only variation to be permitted to the different regiments was in the manner of facings which were to be left to the discretion of the regimental committes or county boards. The uniform consists of tunic, two buttoned knickers and putees.

Headdress

The headdress was decided upon for the Dublin regiment but was left undecided for the other regiments. A considerable body of opinion favoured soft hats but it was found impossible to get a suitable hat of Irish manufacture.

Putees

The Putee presented a difficulty as the well known spiral putee is protected by patents. A semi spiral was decided upon and a special light Irish Serge made to match the uniform. The caps are made of Putee cloth.

Buttons and badges

A design of Button and cap badge was decided upon and dies struck, and buttons made. The button design as submitted by your subcommittee was altered byyou and consequent on this change your sub committee find it will be impossible to protect the design. A Report on this subject will be laid before you. The badge will be protected.”
From Bulmer Hobson Papers N.L.I. MS. 13174 (1)

A photograph of this uniform (Picture 2) also dated 12th August 1914 appeared in the Irish Sword in an article by F. Glenn Thompson. Material – the cap, tunic and breeches were of a grey green serge.

Irish Volunteers Uniform

Picture 2

The cap is made in an almost russian or cossack style with a high stiff crown and very small peak. The peack and chinstrap were both in black leather. The buttons for the chinstrap were small with a flat syrface covered in black cloth. (Original Uniform Cap Picture 3)

Irish Volunteers Uniform Cap

Picture 3

The Tunic

The main body of the tunic was made of the grey green serge. However the tunic had very dark green shoulder straps/epaluttes and cointed cuffs. The tunic has a high collar like a modern shirt. On the front of the tunic were five large brass buttons with a harp decoration and the letters I and V on either side of it. (Picture 4 is an origional I.V. button – note how wide/fat the harp is. Ive checked the manufacturers markings on the back and they are the same as those on uniforms in Kilmainham Jail Museum)

Irish Volunteers Uniform Tunic and button detail

Picture 4

There were two brest pocket seach with a box pleat and two lower large pockets on the hips. The buttons on the pockets and shoulder straps were of the same harp &IV design but smaller in size than those on the uniform front. Each shoulder of the tunic was reinforced by a patch, just Like WW1 British Army uniforms. The back of the tunic was plain.

Trousers

The trousers in the picture are straight and not in the bow legged jodhpurs style. Again they were made of grey-green serge.

Boots

Though not shown they were presumably brown or black.

Equipment

The volunteer in the photo has a five pouch brown leather bandolier. A white canvas knapsack on a sling. The brown leather belt with brass buckle had a harp in the centre surrounded by the inscruiption Oglaign Na h-Eireann was the official pattern (More on this and pics in a later article). The rifle shown is a 303 Lee Metford Mk II with a leather sling which would have taken an 1888 Mark I pattern sword bayonet, worn in a scabbard and frog on the same side as the knapsack.

So this was the official Dublin Head Quarters approved uniform for ordinary volunteers. Very few volunteers would have had the financial resources and been in the position to buy from an approved supplier. Therefore many Volunteers would have gotten their sisters or wives to make their uniform resulting in a wide variation of cuts, colours and cloths all trying to copy and approximate the approved design. Though the standard and style of uniform varied greatly this was the uniform and equipment that most Volunteers aspired to have. And re-enactors should bear this in mind when ordering / making up their own uniform tunic.

Picture 5 shows a well equipped section of Irish Volunteers from the 4th Battalion Dublin Brigade taken in September 1915 when they were commanded by Eamonn Ceannt. Most of they all appear to be wearing the offical pattern uniform except that some have the darker green shoulder straps and pointed cuffs on their tunics whilst others thetunic, shoulder strapps and cuffs are all the one colour. They all seen to have bought the same type of rifle and equipment. However even in this well turned out group there is variation. The first volunteer back row standing on the left weard a Dublin Brigade FF-Drong Atha Cliath cap badge. The man standing beside him simply wears a uniform button in place of a badge on his cap and five of the men have no cap badge at all

Irish Volunteers 4th Battalion Dublin Brigade

Picture 5

Picture 6 is an illustration of an uniformed volunteer from an advert in “The Irish Volunteer” newspaper December 1915. While the tunic, belt, cap and equipment are the same as Picture 2 the approved design – the trousers are of the jodhpurs / riding breeches style.

Uniformed Irish Volunteer advertisement 1915

Picture 6

Picture 7 shows Irish Volunteer Gerald Keogh shot dead outside trinity college during Easter Week 1916.  Again he is wearing the approved uniform and cap.

Irish Volunteer Gerald Keogh Easter week 1916

Picture 7

Picture 8 shows a close up of a group of Irish Volunteers on parade. Note how no two are dressed exactly the same and there is a mixture of full uniforms and civilian clothes. Also note both Boer War and WW1 bandoliers were in use. They appear to be armed with Italian Varetti rifles.

Group of Irish Volunteers on parade

Picture 8

Picture 9 shows a Dublin member of the Irish Volunteers. The only piece of official uniform he is wearing is the cap. Its also interesting that he wears knee high socks over his trousers in place of putees or leggings.

Dublin member of the Irish Volunteers

Picture 9

In 1915 the uniform regulations were changed. These ordered that the shiny black leather peaks on the uniform caps be dulled or covered with cloth, and that the brass buttons be oxidised brown or replaced with leather buttons. The theory behind this is that the shinier parts of the uniform would attract a snipers attention on the battlefield.

Uniform regulations and styles changed rapidly again over the following years based on the availability and practicality of wearing uniforms in the years 1917-1921. I will cover this in later articles.